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AngeL: a tool to disarm computer systems
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New Security Paradigms Workshop archive
Proceedings of the 2001 workshop on New security paradigms table of contents
Cloudcroft, New Mexico
SESSION: Session 4: innovative solutions table of contents
Pages: 63 - 69  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-457-6
Authors
Danilo Bruschi  Università degli Studi di Milano, Via Comelico 39, 20135 Milano --- Italy
Emilia Rosti  Università degli Studi di Milano, Via Comelico 39, 20135 Milano --- Italy
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In this paper we present a tool designed to intercept attacks at the host where they are launched so as to block them before they reach their targets. The tool works both for attacks targeted on the local host and on hosts connected to the network. In the current implementation it can detect and block more than 70 attacks as reported in the literature.The tool is based on the idea of improving the overall security of the Internet by connecting disarmed systems, i.e., hosts that cannot launch attacks against other hosts. Such a strategy was presented in [4]. Here we present an extended version of the tool that has been engineered to consider a wide variety of attacks and to run on various releases of the Linux kernel and the experience learned in building such a tool. A protection mechanism of the tool itself that prevents its removal is also implemented. Experimental results of the impact of the tool on system performance show that the overhead introduced by the tool is negligible from the user's perspective, thus it is not expected to be a hindrance to the successful deployment of the tool.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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McHugh, J., et al., Discussion at NSPW2001, 2001.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Danilo Bruschi: colleagues
Emilia Rosti: colleagues