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An access control language for web services
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Source Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies archive
Proceedings of the seventh ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies table of contents
Monterey, California, USA
SESSION: Access Control Policies and Specifications table of contents
Pages: 23 - 30  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-496-7
Authors
Emin Gün Sirer  Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Ke Wang  Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents an approach for formally specifying and enforcing security policies on web service implementations. Networked services in general, and web services in particular, require extensive amounts of code to ensure that clients respect site-integrity constraints. We provide a language by which these constraints can be expressed and enforced automatically, portably and efficiently. Security policies in our system are specified in a language based on temporal logic, and are processed by an enforcement engine to yield site and platform-specific access control code. This code is integrated with a web server and platform-specific libraries to enforce the specified policy on a given web service. Our approach decouples the security policy specification from service implementations, provides a mandatory access control model for web services, and achieves good performance. We show that up to 22% of the code in a traditional web service module is dedicated to security checking functionality, including checks for client sequencing and parameter validation. We show that our prototype language implementation, WebGuard, enables web programmers to significantly reduce the amount of security checking code they need to develop manually. The quality of the code generated by WebGuard from formal policy specifications is competitive with the latency of handcrafted code to within a few percent.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  8

Collaborative Colleagues:
Emin Gün Sirer: colleagues
Ke Wang: colleagues