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A lightweight approach to specification and analysis of role-based access control extensions
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Source Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies archive
Proceedings of the seventh ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies table of contents
Monterey, California, USA
SESSION: Access Control Policies and Specifications table of contents
Pages: 13 - 22  
Year of Publication: 2002
ISBN:1-58113-496-7
Authors
Andreas Schaad  University of York, York, United Kingdom
Jonathan D. Moffett  University of York, York, United Kingdom
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 43,   Citation Count: 14
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ABSTRACT

Role-based access control is a powerful and policy-neutral concept for enforcing access control. Many extensions have been proposed, the most significant of which are the decentralised administration of role-based systems and the enforcement of constraints. However, the simultaneous integration of these extensions can cause conflicts in a later system implementation. We demonstrate how we use the Alloy language for the specification of a conflict-free role-based system. This specification provides us at the same time with a suitable basis for further analysis by the Alloy constraint analyser.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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D. Jackson. Alloy: A leightweight object modelling notation. Technical Report 797, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, 2000.
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M. Nash and K. Poland. Some conundrums concerning separation of duty. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 201--209, Oakland, CA, 1990.
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CITED BY  14

Collaborative Colleagues:
Andreas Schaad: colleagues
Jonathan D. Moffett: colleagues