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Three-party encrypted key exchange: attacks and a solution
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Volume 34 ,  Issue 4  (October 2000) table of contents
Pages: 12 - 20  
Year of Publication: 2000
ISSN:0163-5980
Authors
Chun-Li Lin  National Cheng-Kung University, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Hung-Min Sun  National Cheng-Kung University, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Tzonelih Hwang  National Cheng-Kung University, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Password-based mechanism is the widely used method for authentication since it allows people to choose their own passwords without any assistant device to generate or store. However, people are used to choose easy-to-remember passwords such that guessing attacks could succeed. In 1992, Bellovin and Merritt proposed Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocols for preventing guessing attacks, in which two communication parties A and B securely share a possibly weak password in advance. In large communication environments, it is inconvenient in key management that every two communication parties mutually share a secret. Three-party EKE protocols, in which all parties (clients) share their secrets with a trusted server only, are more suitable for large communication environments. In 1995, Steiner, Tsudik and Waidner proposed a realization of three-party EKE protocol which is later demonstrated that it is vulnerable to undetectable on-line guessing attacks. In this paper, We will show a new off-line guessing attack on Steiner, Tsudik and Waidners' protocol. Besides, we will also propose a new three-party EKE protocol which not only is secure against both the off-line guessing attack and undetectable on-line guessing attacks but also satisfies the security properties of perfect forward secrecy and known-key security.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, New directions in cryptography, IEEE Trans.,IT-22, pp. 644-654, 1976.
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L. Gong, M. Lomas, R. Needham and J. Saltzer, Protecting Poorly Chosen Secrets from Guessing Attacks, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,11(5), pp. 648-656, 1993.
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B. Jaspan, Dual-workfactor Encrypted Key Exchange: Efficiently Preventing Password Chaining and Dictionary Attacks, Proceedings of the Sixth Annual USENIX Security Conference, pp. 43-50, 1996.
 
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T. Wu, The Secure Remote Password Protocol, Internet Society Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, 1998.
 
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T. Kwon, M. Kang, S. Jung and J. Song, An Improvement of the Password-Based Authentication protocol (K1P) on Security against Replay Attacks, IEICE Trans. Commun.,E82-B(7), pp. 991-997, 1999.
 
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T. Kwon and J. Song, Secure Agreement Scheme for gxy via Password Authentication, Electronics Letters,35(11), pp. 892-893, 1999.

CITED BY  14
Collaborative Colleagues:
Chun-Li Lin: colleagues
Hung-Min Sun: colleagues
Tzonelih Hwang: colleagues