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An analysis of using reflectors for distributed denial-of-service attacks
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Volume 31 ,  Issue 3  (July 2001) table of contents
SESSION: Papers table of contents
Pages: 38 - 47  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISSN:0146-4833
Author
Vern Paxson  International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, CA
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Attackers can render distributed denial-of-service attacks more difficult to defend against by bouncing their flooding traffic off of reflectors; that is, by spoofing requests from the victim to a large set of Internet servers that will in turn send their combined replies to the victim. The resulting dilution of locality in the flooding stream complicates the victim's abilities both to isolate the attack traffic in order to block it, and to use traceback techniques for locating the source of streams of packets with spoofed source addresses, such as ITRACE [Be00a], probabilistic packet marking [SWKA00], [SP01], and SPIE [S+01]. We discuss a number of possible defenses against reflector attacks, finding that most prove impractical, and then assess the degree to which different forms of reflector traffic will have characteristic signatures that the victim can use to identify and filter out the attack traffic. Our analysis indicates that three types of reflectors pose particularly significant threats: DNS and Gnutella servers, and TCP-based servers (particularly Web servers) running on TCP implementations that suffer from predictable initial sequence numbers. We argue in conclusion in support of "reverse ITRACE" [Ba00] and for the utility of packet traceback techniques that work even for low volume flows, such as SPIE.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
{Ba00} C. Barros, "{LONG} A Proposal for ICMP Traceback Messages," http://www.research.att.com/lists/ietf-itrace/2000/09/msg00044.html, Sept. 18, 2000.
 
2
{Be96} S. Bellovin, "Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks," RFC 1948, May 1996.
 
3
{Be00a} S. Bellovin, "ICMP Traceback Messages," Internet Draft, http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/draft-bellovin-itrace-00.txt, March 2000.
 
4
{Be00b} S. Bellovin, "Security Aspects of Napster and Gnutella," http://www.research.att.com/~smb/talks/NapsterGnutella/index.htm, June 2000.
 
5
{Br94} R. Braden, "T/TCP --- TCP Extensions for Transactions: Functional Specification," RFC 1644, July 1994.
 
6
{CFSD90} J. Case, M. Fedor, M. Schoffstall and C. Davin, "Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)," RFC 1157, May 1990.
 
7
{Ce97} CERT Coordination Center, "FTP Bounce," CERT Advisory CA-1997-27, http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1997-27.html, December 1997.
 
8
{F+00} D. Farinacci, T. Li, S. Hanks, D. Meyer and P. Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE), RFC 2784, March 2000.
 
9
{FS00} P. Ferguson and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing," RFC 2827, May 2000.
 
10
{Gn00} Gnutella, http://gnutella.wego.com, 2000.
 
11
{Gu01} Guardent, "Guardent releases information regarding flaw in Internet infrastructure," http://www.guardent.com/pr2001-03-12-ips.html, March 2001.
 
12
{Me00} P. Metzger, private communication, February 2000.
 
13
{Mo87} P. Mockapetris, "Domain names --- implementation and specification," RFC 1035, November 1987.
 
14
{Mo90} J. Mogul and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery," RFC 1191, November 1990.
 
15
{NBBB98} K. Nichols, S. Blake, F. Baker and D. Black, "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers," RFC 2474, December 1998.
 
16
 
17
{Po80} J. Postel, "User Datagram Protocol," RFC 768, August 1980.
 
18
{Po81a} J. Postel, "Internet Protocol," RFC 791, September 1981.
 
19
{Po81b} J. Postel, "Internet Control Message Protocol," RFC 792, September 1981.
 
20
{Po81c} J. Postel, "Transmission Control Protocol," RFC 793, September 1981.
 
21
{Po82} J. Postel, "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol," RFC 821, August 1982.
 
22
{PR85} J. Postel and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol," RFC 959, October 1985.
 
23
{RP94} J. Reynolds and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers," RFC 1700, October 1994.
24
25
26
 
27
{SP01} D. Song and A. Perrig, "Advanced and Authenticated Marking Schemes for IP Traceback," Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, April 2001.

CITED BY  38