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Untrusted hosts and confidentiality: secure program partitioning
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Source ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles archive
Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles table of contents
Banff, Alberta, Canada
SESSION: Trust and dependability table of contents
Pages: 1 - 14  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-389-8
Also published in ...
Authors
Steve Zdancewic  Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Lantian Zheng  Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Nathaniel Nystrom  Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Andrew C. Myers  Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Sponsor
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents secure program partitioning, a language-based technique for protecting confidential data during computation in distributed systems containing mutually untrusted hosts. Confidentiality and integrity policies can be expressed by annotating programs with security types that constrain information flow; these programs can then be partitioned automatically to run securely on heterogeneously trusted hosts. The resulting communicating subprograms collectively implement the original program, yet the system as a whole satisfies the security requirements of participating principals without requiring a universally trusted host machine. The experience in applying this methodology and the performance of the resulting distributed code suggest that this is a promising way to obtain secure distributed computation.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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CITED BY  14

Collaborative Colleagues:
Steve Zdancewic: colleagues
Lantian Zheng: colleagues
Nathaniel Nystrom: colleagues
Andrew C. Myers: colleagues