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Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange
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Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security table of contents
Philadelphia, PA, USA
Session: Group Key Management and Signatures table of contents
Pages: 255 - 264  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-385-5
Authors
Emmanuel Bresson  École Normale Sup&eaucte;rieure, Paris, France
Olivier Chevassut  Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, Berkeley, CA
David Pointcheval  École Normale Sup&eaucte;rieure, Paris, France
Jean-Jacques Quisquater  Univ. Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 7,   Downloads (12 Months): 82,   Citation Count: 29
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ABSTRACT

Group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to provide a pool of players with a shared secret key which may later be used, for example, to achieve multicast message integrity. Over the years, several schemes have been offered. However, no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we present a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define AKE (with "implicit" authentication) as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of an authenticated group Diffie-Hellman scheme and prove its security.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  29

Collaborative Colleagues:
Emmanuel Bresson: colleagues
Olivier Chevassut: colleagues
David Pointcheval: colleagues
Jean-Jacques Quisquater: colleagues