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OCB: a block-cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security table of contents
Philadelphia, PA, USA
Session: Cryptosystems table of contents
Pages: 196 - 205  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-385-5
Authors
Phillip Rogaway  Univ. of California, Davis, CA & Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand
Mihir Bellare  Univ. of California at San Diego, La Jolla, CA
John Black  Univ. of Nevada, Reno, NV
Ted Krovetz  Digital Fountain, San Francisco, CA
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 8,   Downloads (12 Months): 55,   Citation Count: 14
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ABSTRACT

We describe a parallelizable block-cipher mode of operation that simultaneously provides privacy and authenticity. OCB encrypts-and-authenticates a nonempty string M &egr; {0,1}• using \lceil |M|/n\rceil + 2 block-cipher invocations, where n is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Additional overhead is small. OCB refines a scheme, IAPM, suggested by Charanjit Jutla. Desirable properties of OCB include: the ability to encrypt a bit string of arbitrary length into a ciphertext of minimal length; cheap offset calculations; cheap session setup; a single underlying cryptographic key; no extended-precision addition; a nearly optimal number of block-cipher calls; and no requirement for a random IV. We prove OCB secure, quantifying the adversary's ability to violate the mode's privacy or authenticity in terms of the quality of its block cipher as a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) or as a strong PRP, respectively.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  14

Collaborative Colleagues:
Phillip Rogaway: colleagues
Mihir Bellare: colleagues
John Black: colleagues
Ted Krovetz: colleagues