|
ABSTRACT
Although different organizations operate under different requirements for protection of their data, increasingly there is a need for organizations to connect their computing resources together to achieve common goals. The fundamental problem addressed in this paper is to capture the algebra used in composing access control policies of collaborating organizations. In doing so, we seek a framework that can be viewed at many levels of abstraction (such as abstract vs. explicit or propositional vs. predicate), independent of implementation mechanisms and environments, and is expressive enough to model existing practices of policy compositions.Propositional version consists of a syntax where policies are viewed as abstract symbols, and semantics consists of authorization state transformers, where an authorization state is a collection of (subject, object, access set) triples and a set of propositions satisfied by them. Syntactic rules are provided to simplify policy expressions without knowing their semantics, thereby supporting algebraic manipulations of uninterpreted policies. Because our algebra is at an abstract level, it can model any policy independent of the language that is used to implement it. We show how to reason about completeness, consistency, unambiguity and of abstractly specified policies and their semantic equivalence.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
| |
1
|
B.Alper and F.B.Schneider.De .ning live ess. Information Processing Letters ,21(4):181 -185, October 1985.
|
| |
2
|
B.Alpern a d F.B.Sch eider.Recognizing safety a d liveness.Distribute Computing ,2:117 -126,1987.
|
| |
3
|
|
| |
4
|
B.T.Blaustein et al.A model of secure federated data manageme t.Technical report,The MITRE Corporation,1991.
|
 |
5
|
|
 |
6
|
|
| |
7
|
V.D.Gilgor,S.I.Gavrila,a d D.Ferraiolo.O the formal de .nitio of separatio -of-duty policies and their compositio s.In IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security an Privacy , pages 173 -181,1998.
|
| |
8
|
|
| |
9
|
S.Jajodia,M.Kudo,and V.S.Subrahmania . Provisional authorizatio s.In A.Ghosh,editor, Recent A vances in Secure and Private E-Commerce . Kluwer Academic Publishers,Bosto ,2001.
|
 |
10
|
|
| |
11
|
|
 |
12
|
Sushil Jajodia , Pierangela Samarati , V. S. Subrahmanian , Eliza Bertino, A unified framework for enforcing multiple access control policies, Proceedings of the 1997 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data, p.474-485, May 11-15, 1997, Tucson, Arizona, United States
|
| |
13
|
|
| |
14
|
|
| |
15
|
|
| |
16
|
J.McLean.Algebra of security.I Proc.IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy ,pages 2 -7,Oakland,CA, May 1998.
|
| |
17
|
F.B.Sch eider.E forceable security policies. Tech ical Report TR 98-1664,Departme t of Computer Science,Cornell U iversity,1998.
|
| |
18
|
|
CITED BY 5
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Qun Ni , Elisa Bertino , Jorge Lobo, D-algebra for composing access control policy decisions, Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security, March 10-12, 2009, Sydney, Australia
|
|