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Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce table of contents
Tampa, Florida, USA
Pages: 264 - 267  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-387-1
Authors
Philippe Golle  Stanford University, Stanford CA
Kevin Leyton-Brown  Stanford University, Stanford CA
Ilya Mironov  Stanford University, Stanford CA
Sponsor
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 9,   Downloads (12 Months): 64,   Citation Count: 41
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ABSTRACT

We consider the free-rider problem that arises in peer-to-peer file sharing networks such as Napster: the problem that individual users are provided with no incentive for adding value to the network. We examine the design implications of the assumption that users will selfishly act to maximize their own rewards, by constructing a formal game theoretic model of the system and analyzing equilibria of user strategies under several novel payment mechanisms. We support and extend upon our theoretical predictions with experimental results from a multi-agent reinforcement learning model.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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G. Marwell and R. Ames. Experiments in the provision of public goods: I. resources, interest, group size, and the free-rider problem. American J. of Sociology, 84, 1979.
 
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A. M. Odlyzko. The history of communications and its implications for the internet, 2000. www.research.att.com/~amo.
 
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M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.
 
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P. Gummadi S. Saroiu and S. Gribble. Measurement study of peer-to-peer file sharing systems. TR UW-CSE-01-06-02, 2001.
 
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CITED BY  41

Collaborative Colleagues:
Philippe Golle: colleagues
Kevin Leyton-Brown: colleagues
Ilya Mironov: colleagues