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An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce table of contents
Tampa, Florida, USA
Pages: 125 - 136  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-387-1
Authors
Edo Zurel  The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Noam Nisan  The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Sponsor
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 10,   Downloads (12 Months): 26,   Citation Count: 16
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ABSTRACT

We propose a heuristic for allocation in combinatorial auctions. We first run an approximation algorithm on the linear programming relaxation of the combinatorial auction. We then run a sequence of greedy algorithms, starting with the order on the bids determined by the approximate linear program and continuing in a hill-climbing fashion using local improvements in the order of bids. We have implemented the algorithm and have tested it on the complete corpus of instances provided by Vohra and de Vries as well as on instances drawn from the distributions of Leyton-Brown, Pearson, and Shoham. Our algorithm typically runs two to three orders of magnitude faster than the reported running times of Vohra and de Vries, while achieving an average approximation error of less than 1%. This algorithm can provide, in less than a minute of CPU time, excellent solutions for problems with over 1000 items and 10,000 bids. We thus believe that combinatorial auctions for most purposes face no practical computational hurdles.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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A. Andersson, M. Tenhunen, and F. Ygge. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination. In ICMAS, 2000.
 
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N. Nisan. The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions. Available from http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~noam/ccaucecon.pdf, 2001.
 
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T. W. Sandholm. Limitations of the vickrey auction in computational multiagent systems. In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Multiagent Systems (ICMAS-96), pages 299-306, Keihanna Plaza, Kyoto, Japan, December 1996.
 
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R. Vohra and S. de Vries. Combinatorial auctions: A survey, 2000.

CITED BY  16