| An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions |
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Electronic Commerce
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Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
table of contents
Tampa, Florida, USA
Pages: 125 - 136
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-387-1
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Authors
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Edo Zurel
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The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
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Noam Nisan
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The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 10, Downloads (12 Months): 26, Citation Count: 16
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ABSTRACT
We propose a heuristic for allocation in combinatorial auctions. We first run an approximation algorithm on the linear programming relaxation of the combinatorial auction. We then run a sequence of greedy algorithms, starting with the order on the bids determined by the approximate linear program and continuing in a hill-climbing fashion using local improvements in the order of bids. We have implemented the algorithm and have tested it on the complete corpus of instances provided by Vohra and de Vries as well as on instances drawn from the distributions of Leyton-Brown, Pearson, and Shoham. Our algorithm typically runs two to three orders of magnitude faster than the reported running times of Vohra and de Vries, while achieving an average approximation error of less than 1%. This algorithm can provide, in less than a minute of CPU time, excellent solutions for problems with over 1000 items and 10,000 bids. We thus believe that combinatorial auctions for most purposes face no practical computational hurdles.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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A. Andersson, M. Tenhunen, and F. Ygge. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination. In ICMAS, 2000.
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Daniel Lehmann , Liaden Ita O'Callaghan , Yoav Shoham, Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.96-102, November 03-05, 1999, Denver, Colorado, United States
[doi> 10.1145/336992.337016]
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Kevin Leyton-Brown , Mark Pearson , Yoav Shoham, Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms, Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.66-76, October 17-20, 2000, Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States
[doi> 10.1145/352871.352879]
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N. Nisan. The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions. Available from http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~noam/ccaucecon.pdf, 2001.
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T. W. Sandholm. Limitations of the vickrey auction in computational multiagent systems. In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Multiagent Systems (ICMAS-96), pages 299-306, Keihanna Plaza, Kyoto, Japan, December 1996.
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R. Vohra and S. de Vries. Combinatorial auctions: A survey, 2000.
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A. Giovannucci , J. A. Rodríguez-Aguilar , A. Reyes , F. X. Noria , Jesús Cerquides, Enacting agent-based services for automated procurement, Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, v.21 n.2, p.183-199, March, 2008
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