| Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions |
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Electronic Commerce
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Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
table of contents
Tampa, Florida, USA
Pages: 115 - 124
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-387-1
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 4, Downloads (12 Months): 40, Citation Count: 18
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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces RoxyBot, one of the top-scoring agents in the First International Trading Agent Competition. A TAC agent simulates one vision of future travel agents: it represents a set of clients in simultaneous auctions, trading complementary (e.g., airline tickets and hotel reservations) and substitutable (e.g., symphony and theater tickets) goods. RoxyBot faced two key technical challenges in TAC: (i) allocation---assigning purchased goods to clients at the end of a game instance so as to maximize total client utility, and (ii) completion---determining the optimal quantity of each resource to buy and sell given client preferences, current holdings, and market prices. For the dimensions of TAC, an optimal solution to the allocation problem is tractable, and RoxyBot uses a search algorithm based on A* to produce optimal allocations. An optimal solution to the completion problem is also tractable, but in the interest of minimizing bidding cycle time, RoxyBot solves the completion problem using beam search, producing approximately optimal completions. RoxyBot's completer relies on an innovative data structure called a priceline.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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D. Cliff and J. Bruten. Zero is not enough: On the lower limit of agent intelligence for continuous double auction markets. HP Technical Report HPL-97-141, 1997.
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A. Greenwald, J. Boyan, R. M. Kirby, and J. Reiter. Bid determination in simultaneous auctions. Available at http://www.cs.brown.edu/people/amygreen/, 2001.
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Kevin Leyton-Brown , Mark Pearson , Yoav Shoham, Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms, Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.66-76, October 17-20, 2000, Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States
[doi> 10.1145/352871.352879]
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Peter Stone , Michael L. Littman , Satinder Singh , Michael Kearns, ATTac-2000: an adaptive autonomous bidding agent, Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents, p.238-245, May 2001, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
[doi> 10.1145/375735.376301]
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G. Tesauro and G. R. Galperin. On-line policy improvement using Monte-Carlo search. In M. C. Mozer, M. I. Jordan, and T. Petsche, editors, Advances in NIPS, volume 9. MIT Press, 1997.
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M. P. Wellman, P. R. Wurman, K. O'Malley, R. Bangera, S.-d. Lin, D. Reeves,and W. E.Walsh. A trading agent competition. IEEE Internet Computing, April 2001.
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CITED BY 18
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Michael P. Wellman , Amy Greenwald , Peter Stone , Peter R. Wurman, The 2001 trading agent competition, Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence, p.935-941, July 28-August 01, 2002, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
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Shih-Fen Cheng , Evan Leung , Kevin M. Lochner , Kevin O'Malley , Daniel M. Reeves , L. Julian Schvartzman , Michael P. Wellman, Walverine: a Walrasian trading agent, Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, July 14-18, 2003, Melbourne, Australia
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Shih-Fen Cheng , Evan Leung , Kevin M. Lochner , Kevin O'Malley , Daniel M. Reeves , Julian L. Schvartzman , Michael P. Wellman, Walverine: a Walrasian trading agent, Decision Support Systems, v.39 n.2, p.169-184, April 2005
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Peter Stone , Robert E. Schapire , Michael L. Littman , János A. Csirik , David McAllester, Decision-theoretic bidding based on learned density models in simultaneous, interacting auctions, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, v.19 n.1, p.209-242, July 2003
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