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Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce table of contents
Tampa, Florida, USA
Pages: 115 - 124  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-387-1
Authors
Amy Greenwald  Brown University, Providence, RI
Justin Boyan  ITA Software, Cambridge, MA
Sponsor
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 37,   Citation Count: 19
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ABSTRACT

This paper introduces RoxyBot, one of the top-scoring agents in the First International Trading Agent Competition. A TAC agent simulates one vision of future travel agents: it represents a set of clients in simultaneous auctions, trading complementary (e.g., airline tickets and hotel reservations) and substitutable (e.g., symphony and theater tickets) goods. RoxyBot faced two key technical challenges in TAC: (i) allocation---assigning purchased goods to clients at the end of a game instance so as to maximize total client utility, and (ii) completion---determining the optimal quantity of each resource to buy and sell given client preferences, current holdings, and market prices. For the dimensions of TAC, an optimal solution to the allocation problem is tractable, and RoxyBot uses a search algorithm based on A* to produce optimal allocations. An optimal solution to the completion problem is also tractable, but in the interest of minimizing bidding cycle time, RoxyBot solves the completion problem using beam search, producing approximately optimal completions. RoxyBot's completer relies on an innovative data structure called a priceline.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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D. Cliff and J. Bruten. Zero is not enough: On the lower limit of agent intelligence for continuous double auction markets. HP Technical Report HPL-97-141, 1997.
 
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A. Greenwald, J. Boyan, R. M. Kirby, and J. Reiter. Bid determination in simultaneous auctions. Available at http://www.cs.brown.edu/people/amygreen/, 2001.
 
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G. Tesauro and G. R. Galperin. On-line policy improvement using Monte-Carlo search. In M. C. Mozer, M. I. Jordan, and T. Petsche, editors, Advances in NIPS, volume 9. MIT Press, 1997.
 
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M. P. Wellman, P. R. Wurman, K. O'Malley, R. Bangera, S.-d. Lin, D. Reeves,and W. E.Walsh. A trading agent competition. IEEE Internet Computing, April 2001.

CITED BY  19

Collaborative Colleagues:
Amy Greenwald: colleagues
Justin Boyan: colleagues