Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities

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Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities

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Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce table of contents

Tampa, Florida, USA

Pages: 18 - 28

Year of Publication: 2001

ISBN:1-58113-387-1

Authors

Benny Lehmann	Digital Fuel
Daniel Lehmann	The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Noam Nisan	The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

Sponsor

SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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Downloads (6 Weeks): n/a, Downloads (12 Months): n/a, Citation Count: 24

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ABSTRACT

In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of valuations that exhibit no complementarities, a hierarchy that includes also OR and XOR combinations of singleton valuations, and valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property. While we show that the allocation problem among valuations with decreasing marginal utilities is NP-hard, we present an efficient greedy 2-approximation algorithm for this case. No such approximation algorithm exists in a setting allowing for complementarities. Some results about strategic aspects of combinatorial auctions among players with decreasing marginal utilities are also presented.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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	Meir Bing , Daniel Lehmann , Paul Milgrom, Presentation and structure of substitutes valuations, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, May 17-20, 2004, New York, NY, USA
	Ning Chen , Xiaotie Deng , Xiaoming Sun, On complexity of single-minded auction, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, v.69 n.4, p.675-687, December 2004
	Shahar Dobzinski , Noam Nisan , Michael Schapira, Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders, Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, May 22-24, 2005, Baltimore, MD, USA
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