On the relationship between permission and obligation

ABSTRACT

In two interesting papers ((1983), (1986)) Thorne McCarty has presented a semantics for the central deontic concepts, permission and obligation, based upon a semantics for an action language. The latter, in turn, was constructed along lines deriving from Pratt-Harel dynamic logic. I shall here offer some critical comments on McCarty's analysis of the relationship between obligation and permission, and of his account of so-called “free-choice” permissions; these come in section II, below. In section I an outline sketch is given of the main features of McCarty's semantics with which the criticism will be concerned.

REFERENCES

• 1: Hilpinen,R., (lg71), Deontic Logic' introductory and systematic readings, Reide!,Dordrecht.
• 2: Jones, A,J.I. & P6rn,I.,"Ideality, Sub-ldeality and Deontic Logic", S nt_~ 65, no.2, 1985.
• 3: Konolige,K.,(1985), "Belief and Incompleteness", in Hobbs, J.R. & Moore, R.C., eds., Fomal Theories of the Commonsense ~~orld, Ablex, NJ.
• 4: McCarty,L.T., (1983), "Pemissions and Obligations" in Proceedings IJCAI-83.
• 5: McCarty,L.T., (1~86), "Permissions and Ob! igations -an informal introduction", in Martino,A.A. & Socci Natal i,F., eds., Automated Analysis of Lega ! Texts, North-Hol ! and, Amsterdam.

INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  F. Theory of Computation
  F.3 LOGICS AND MEANINGS OF PROGRAMS

Additional Classification:
  F. Theory of Computation
  F.3 LOGICS AND MEANINGS OF PROGRAMS
      F.3.1 Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs
          Subjects: Logics of programs

General Terms:
Human Factors, Languages, Theory