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Legal reasoning in 3-D
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Source International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law archive
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Artificial intelligence and law table of contents
Boston, Massachusetts, United States
Pages: 155 - 163  
Year of Publication: 1987
ISBN:0-89791-230-6
Author
M. Belzer  Univ. of Georgia, Athens, GA
Sponsor
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

This article contains a theory of normative defeasible reasoning based on the modal deontic logic 3-D. The concept of “relative weight” between competing norms is defined, and 3-D is used to formalize two types of legal reasoning (“subsumptive” and “means/end”). A general overview is given of a PROLOG program, 3dpr, that implements the 3-D based theory of normative reasoning.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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