Formalizing legal coherence

ABSTRACT

This paper briefly argues for a (particular variant of) a coherence theory of legal justification and theory construction. It does so by placing coherentism in a tradition of general epistemology and practical reasoning. One part of the theory, namely the part that deals with the relation between abstract goals and concrete regulations, is described in detail, and formalized.

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  K. Computing Milieux
  K.4 COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY

Additional Classification:
  D. Software
  D.2 SOFTWARE ENGINEERING

General Terms:
Management, Theory

Keywords:
coherence, goal-based reasoning, legal justification, theory construction