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ABSTRACT
Basic techniques to prove the unconditional security of quantum crypto graphy are described. They are applied to a quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard [1984]. The proof considers a practical variation on the protocol in which the channel is noisy and photos may be lost during the transmission. Each individual signal sent into the channel must contain a single photon or any two-dimensional system in the exact state described in the protocol. No restriction is imposed on the detector used at the receiving side of the channel, except that whether or not the received system is detected must be independent of the basis used to measure this system.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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REVIEW
"Jonathan Samuel Golan : Reviewer"
The first, rather panicky, reaction to the possibility of quantum computing was that all public-key cryptographic systems were hopelessly compromised. Soon enough, however, new methods of quantum cryptography were developed. The techniques for eva
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