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A stable and efficient buyer coalition formation scheme for e-marketplaces
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Source International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents table of contents
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Pages: 576 - 583  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-326-X
Authors
Junichi Yamamoto  SI Technology Development Center, Toshiba Corporation, 3-22 Katamachi, Fuchu, Tokyo, 183-8512 Japan
Katia Sycara  The Robotics Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA
Sponsor
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 7,   Downloads (12 Months): 39,   Citation Count: 21
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ABSTRACT

Buyer coalitions are beneficial in e-marketplaces because they allow buyers to take advantage of volume discounts. However, existing buyer coalition formation schemes do not provide buyers with any means to declare and match their preferences or to calculate the division of the surplus in a stable manner. Concepts and algorithms for coalition formation have been investigated in game theory and multi-agent systems research, but because of the computational complexity, they cannot deal with thousands of buyers which could join a coalition in practice. In this paper, we propose a new buyer coalition formation scheme GroupBuyAuction. At GroupBuyAuction, buyers form a group based on a category of items. A buyer can post an OR-asking for multiple items within a category. An OR-asking is a list of items indicating that the buyer would buy any one of the items in the list with some particular reservation price. Sellers bid volume discount prices. The group leader agent splits the group into sub groups (coalitions), selects a winning seller for each coalition, and calculates surplus division among buyers. We prove that this scheme guarantees the stability in surplus division within each coalition in terms of the core in game theory. Simulation results show that, under most conditions, our scheme increases buyers' utility, and allows more buyers to obtain items compared to traditional group buying schemes, such as those used at existing commercial WWW sites.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  23

Collaborative Colleagues:
Junichi Yamamoto: colleagues
Katia Sycara: colleagues