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Automated negotiation from declarative contract descriptions
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Source International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents table of contents
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Pages: 51 - 58  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-326-X
Authors
Daniel M. Reeves  University of Michigan Artificial Intelligence Lab., 1101 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI
Michael P. Wellman  University of Michigan Artificial Intelligence Lab., 1101 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI
Benjamin N. Grosof  MIT Sloan School of Management, 50 Memorial Drive, Rm E53-317, Cambridge, MA
Sponsor
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Our approach for automating the negotiation of business contracts proceeds in three broad steps. First, determine the structure of the negotiation process byapplying general knowledge about auctions and domain-specific knowledge about the contract subject along with preferences from potential buyers and sellers. Second, translate the determined negotiation structure into an operational specification for an auction platform. Third, map the negotiation results to a final contract. We have implemented a prototype which supports these steps, employing a declarative specification (in Courteous Logic Programs) of (1) high-level knowledge about alternative negotiation structures, (2) general-case rules about auction parameters, (3) rules to map the auction parameters to a specific auction platform, and (4) special-case rules for subject domains. We demonstrate the flexibility of this approach by automatically generating several alternative negotiation structures for a previous domain: travel-shopping in a trading agent competition.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Daniel M. Reeves: colleagues
Michael P. Wellman: colleagues
Benjamin N. Grosof: colleagues