| Automated negotiation from declarative contract descriptions |
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International Conference on Autonomous Agents
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Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
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Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Pages: 51 - 58
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-326-X
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Authors
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Daniel M. Reeves
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University of Michigan Artificial Intelligence Lab., 1101 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI
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Michael P. Wellman
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University of Michigan Artificial Intelligence Lab., 1101 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI
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Benjamin N. Grosof
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MIT Sloan School of Management, 50 Memorial Drive, Rm E53-317, Cambridge, MA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 7, Downloads (12 Months): 19, Citation Count: 5
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ABSTRACT
Our approach for automating the negotiation of business contracts proceeds in three broad steps. First, determine the structure of the negotiation process byapplying general knowledge about auctions and domain-specific knowledge about the contract subject along with preferences from potential buyers and sellers. Second, translate the determined negotiation structure into an operational specification for an auction platform. Third, map the negotiation results to a final contract. We have implemented a prototype which supports these steps, employing a declarative specification (in Courteous Logic Programs) of (1) high-level knowledge about alternative negotiation structures, (2) general-case rules about auction parameters, (3) rules to map the auction parameters to a specific auction platform, and (4) special-case rules for subject domains. We demonstrate the flexibility of this approach by automatically generating several alternative negotiation structures for a previous domain: travel-shopping in a trading agent competition.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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CITED BY 5
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Adam J. Lee , Jodie P. Boyer , Lars E. Olson , Carl A. Gunter, Defeasible security policy composition for web services, Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security, p.45-54, November 03-03, 2006, Alexandria, Virginia, USA
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