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An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling
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Source International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents table of contents
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Pages: 43 - 50  
Year of Publication: 2001
ISBN:1-58113-326-X
Authors
David C. Parkes  Computer and Information Science Department, University of Pennsylvania, 200 South 33rd Street, Philadelphia, PA
Lyle H. Ungar  Computer and Information Science Department, University of Pennsylvania, 200 South 33rd Street, Philadelphia, PA
Sponsor
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 30,   Downloads (12 Months): 63,   Citation Count: 10
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ABSTRACT

We present a computational study of an auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. The method is well suited to the natural information and control structure of mod- ern railroads. We assume separate network territories, with an autonomous dispatch agent responsible for the ow of trains over each territory. Each train is represented by a self-interested agent that bids for the right to travel across the network from its source to destination, submitting bids to multiple dispatch agents along its route as necessary. The bidding language allows trains to bid for the right to enter and exit territories at particular times, and also to represent indifference over a range of times. Computational results on a simple network with straight-forward best-response bid- ding strategies demonstrate that the auction computes near- optimal system-wide schedules. In addition, the method appears to have useful scaling properties, both with the number of trains and with the number of dispatchers, and generates less extremal solutions than those obtained using traditional centralized optimization techniques.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  11

Collaborative Colleagues:
David C. Parkes: colleagues
Lyle H. Ungar: colleagues