Adversarial models in evolutionary game dynamics

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Adversarial models in evolutionary game dynamics

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Symposium on Discrete Algorithms archive
Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms table of contents

Washington, D.C., United States

Pages: 719 - 720

Year of Publication: 2001

ISBN:0-89871-490-7

Authors

G. Istrate	Center for Nonlinear Sciences, Los Alamos National Laboratory, MS B258, Los Alamos, NM
M. V. Marathe	TSA-2, Los Alamos National Laboratory, MS M997, Los Alamos, NM
S. S. Ravi	Computer Science Dept., SUNY at Albany, Albany, NY

Sponsors

SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
SIAM : Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics

Publisher

Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics Philadelphia, PA, USA

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 1, Downloads (12 Months): 21, Citation Count: 1

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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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