ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Full text PdfPdf (919 KB)
Source
Communications of the ACM archive
Volume 20 ,  Issue 7  (July 1977) table of contents
Pages: 504 - 513  
Year of Publication: 1977
ISSN:0001-0782
Authors
Dorothy E. Denning  Purdue Univ., West Lafayette, IN
Peter J. Denning  Purdue Univ., West Lafayette, IN
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 20,   Downloads (12 Months): 127,   Citation Count: 140
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/359636.359712
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

ertification mechanism for verifying the secure flow of information through a program. Because it exploits the properties of a lattice structure among security classes, the procedure is sufficiently simple that it can easily be included in the analysis phase of most existing compilers. Appropriate semantics are presented and proved correct. An important application is the confinement problem: The mechanism can prove that a program cannot cause supposedly nonconfidential results to depend on confidential input data.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

1
 
2
 
3
Bell, D.E., and LaPadula, L.J. Secure Computer Systems: Mathematical Foundations, Vol. 1-III. ESD-TR-73-278, The MITRE Corp., Bedford, Mass.
 
4
Birkhoff, G. Lattice Theory. Amer. Math. Soc. Col. Pub. XXV, Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, R.I., 3rd ed., 1967.
 
5
Denning, D.E., Denning, P.J., and Graham, G.S. Selectively confined subsystems. Proc. Int. Workshop on Protection in Operating Systems, IRIA-Laboria, France, Aug. 1974, pp. 55-61.
 
6
7
 
8
Denning, D.E. On the derivation of lattice structured information flow policies. Tech. Rep. TR-179, Dep. of Comptr. Sci., Purdue U., W. Lafayette, Ind., March 1976.
 
9
Fenton, J.S. Information protection systems. Ph.D. Diss., Comptr. Lab., U. of Cambridge, England, 1973.
 
10
Fenton, J.S. Memoryless subsystems. Comptr. J. 17, 2 (May 1974), 143-147.
 
11
Fenton, J.S. An abstract computer model demonstrating directional information flow. U. of Cambridge, Cambridge, England, 1974.
12
 
13
Gat, I., and Saal, H.J. Memoryless execution: A programmer's viewpoint. IBM Tech. Rep. 025, IBM Israeli Scientific Ctr., Haifa, March 1975.
 
14
Graham, G.S., and Denning, P.J. Protection-principles and practice. Proc. AFIPS 1972 SJCC, Vol. 40, AFIPS Press, Montvale, N.J., pp. 417-429.
 
15
16
 
17
IBM. System/360 PL/I (F) Language Reference Manual. Rep. No. GC28-8201-3, IBM Systems Reference Library, 1971.
 
18
19
20
21
22
23
 
24
 
25
 
26
Rotenberg, L.J. Making computers keep secrets. Ph.D. Th., MAC-TR-115, Project Mac, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., Feb. 1974.
 
27
 
28
Stone, K.S. Discrete Mathematical Structures and Their Applications. Science Research Associates, Chicago, 1973.
29
 
30
Weissman, C. Security controls in the ADEPT-50 time-sharing system. Proc. AFIPS 1969 FJCC, Vol. 35, AFIPS Press, Montvale, N.J., pp. 119-133.
 
31
Wirth, N. The programming language Pascal. Acta Informatica 1, 1 (1971), 35-63.

CITED BY  140

Collaborative Colleagues:
Dorothy E. Denning: colleagues
Peter J. Denning: colleagues