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Enforceable security policies
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Source ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 3 ,  Issue 1  (February 2000) table of contents
Pages: 30 - 50  
Year of Publication: 2000
ISSN:1094-9224
Author
Fred B. Schneider  Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 50,   Downloads (12 Months): 370,   Citation Count: 114
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ABSTRACT

A precise characterization is given for the class of security policies enforceable with mechanisms that work by monitoring system execution, and automata are introduced for specifying exactly that class of security policies. Techniques to enforce security policies specified by such automata are also discussed.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  114


REVIEW

"Jaak Tepandi : Reviewer"

A security policy defines execution that, for one reason or another, has been deemed unacceptable. For example, a security policy might concern access control, information flow or availability. The practicality of a security policy depends on  more...