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Internetwork externalities and free information goods
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States
Pages: 107 - 116  
Year of Publication: 2000
ISBN:1-58113-272-7
Authors
Geoffrey G. Parker  Tulane University, Freeman School of Business, New Orleans, LA
Marshall W. Van Alstyne  University of Michigan, School of Information, Ann Arbor, MI
Sponsor
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Adams, W.J. and Yellen, J.L. (1976). "Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly" Quarterly Journal of Econom~s 90 (August): 475-98.
 
2
Bakos, Y. and E. BrynjoKsson (1997). "Aggregat~n and D~aggregafion of Information Goods: Implications for Bundling, Site Licensing, and Micropayment Systems" in Internet Pub~shing and Beyond: The Economics of Digital Information and InteHectuM Propert~ D. Hurle~ B. Kahin and H. Varian (eds.). Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
 
3
Bulow, J. I., J. D. Geanakoplos, et al. (198~). "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements." Journal of Political Economy 9~(~): 488-~11.
 
4
Chuang, J. and M. Sirbu (1997). "Bundling & Unbundling of Information Goods: Economic Incentives for the Network Delivery of Academic Journal Articles".in Internet Publishing and Beyond: The Econom~s of Digital Informatbn and Intellectual Property. D. Hurle~ B. Kahin and H. Varian (eds). Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
 
5
DeGraba, P. (1996). "Why Lever into a Zero Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion." Journal of Economics and Management Strategy $(S): 433-447.
 
6
FaE S. and ~.K. Macki~Mason (1999). "Competition Between Firms that Bundle Information Goods." Univer~ty of Michigan. Program for Research on the Information Economy (PRIE) working paper
 
7
Hitt, L. and Chen, P. (2000). "Customed Bundling: A New Strategy for Selling Information Goods." Wharton School of Business working paper.
 
8
Hotelling, H. (1929). "Stabi~ty in Competition." Economic Journal 39(3): 433-447.
 
9
Katz, M. L. and C. Shapiro (1985). "Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility" The American Economic Review 75(3): 424-440.
 
10
Lohr, S. (1999). "With Acquistion, Sun Takes Aim at Microsoft." New York Times. Aug, 31; Technology Section.
 
11
Macki-Mason, J. and Riveros, J. (1999) "Exploring the Bundling Design Space: Generalized Subscriptions." University of Michigan; Program for Research on the Information Economy (PRIE) working paper.
 
12
McAffe, P., McMillan, J., Whinston, M.. (1989). "Mulfiproduct monopol~ commodity bundling, and correlation of values." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 pp. 371-383.
 
13
Nalebuff, B. (1999). "Bund~ng." Yale School of Management, New Haven, CT.
 
14
Salinger, M. (1995). "A Graphical Analysis of Bundling." Journal of Business 68 pp 85-98.
 
15
Shapiro, C. and H. Varian (1999). "The art of Standards Wars." California Management Review 41(2): 8-32.
 
16
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
 
17
Varian, H. (1997). Versioning Information Goods. Berkely University of California, Berkley.
 
18
Whinston, M. (1990). "Tying, Foreclosure, and ExduMon." American Economic Review 80(4): 837-859.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Geoffrey G. Parker: colleagues
Marshall W. Van Alstyne: colleagues