AkBA

Subscribe (Full Service)


	Search: The ACM Digital Library The Guide

	Feedback

AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction

Full text

Pdf (346 KB)

Source

Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents

Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States

Pages: 21 - 29

Year of Publication: 2000

ISBN:1-58113-272-7

Authors

Peter R. Wurman	Computer Science, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
Michael P. Wellman	Computer Science and Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI

Sponsor

SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 5, Downloads (12 Months): 20, Citation Count: 30

Additional Information:

references cited by index terms collaborative colleagues

Tools and Actions:	Request Permissions Review this Article Save this Article to a Binder Display Formats: BibTeX EndNote ACM Ref

DOI Bookmark:	Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/352871.352874 What is a DOI?

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	Integer Programming for Combinatorial Auction Winner Determination, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000), p.39, July 10-12, 2000
	2	J. S. Banks, J. O. Ledyard, and D. P. Porter. Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach. RAND Journal of Economics, 20:1{22, 1989.
	3	S. Bikhchandani and J. W. Mamer. Competitive equilibrium in an economy with indivisibilities. Journal of Economic Theory, 74:385{413, 1997.
	4	S. Bikhchandani and J. M. Ostroy. The package assignment model. Technical report, University of California at Los Angeles, November 1998.
	5	S. de Vries and R. Vohra. Combinatorial auctions: A brief survey. Technical report, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, December 1999.
	6	G. Demange, D. Gale, and M. Sotomayor. Multi-item auctions. Journal of Political Economy, 94:863{72, 1986.
	7	C. DeMartini, A. M. Kwasnica, J. O. Ledyard, and D. Porter. A new and improved design for multi-object iterative auctions. Technical report, California Institute of Technology, November 1998.
	8	Yuzo Fujishima , Kevin Leyton-Brown , Yoav Shoham, Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches, Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, p.548-553, July 31-August 06, 1999
	9	F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes. Journal of Economic Theory, 87:95{124, 1999.
	10	A. S. Kelso and V. P. Crawford. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. Econometrica, 50:1483{1504, 1982.
	11	T. Koopmans and M. Beckmann. Assignment problems and the location of economic activities. Econometrica, 25:53{76, 1957.
	12	H. B. Leonard. Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions. Journal of Political Economy, 91(3):461{479, 1983.
	13	J. K. MacKie-Mason and H. R. Varian. Generalized Vickrey Auctions. Technical report, University of Michigan, July 1994.
	14	R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature, 25:699{738, 1987.
	15	R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Analyzing the airwaves auction. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1):159{175, 1996.
	16	J. McMillan. Selling spectrum rights. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(3):145{162, 1994.
	17	P. Milgrom. Auctions and bidding: A primer. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(3):3{22, 1989.
	18	Noam Nisan, Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.1-12, October 17-20, 2000, Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States [doi>10.1145/352871.352872]
	19	David C. Parkes, iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction, Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.148-157, November 03-05, 1999, Denver, Colorado, United States [doi>10.1145/336992.337032]
	20	David C. Parkes , Lyle H. Ungar, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice, Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, p.74-81, July 30-August 03, 2000
	21	Michael H. Rothkopf , Aleksandar Pekec , Ronald M. Harstad, Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions, Management Science, v.44 n.8, p.1131-1147, August 1998 [doi>10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1131]
	22	Tuomas Sandholm, An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions, Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, p.542-547, July 31-August 06, 1999
	23	M. A. Satterthwaite and S. R. Williams. Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and e~ciency. Journal of Economic Theory, 48:107{133, 1989.
	24	L. Shapley and M. Shubik. The assignment gameI: The core. International Journal of Game Theory, 1:111{130, 1972.
	25	W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8{37, 1961.
	26	P. R. Wurman, M. P. Wellman, and W. E. Walsh. A parametrization of the auction design space. Games and Economic Behavior, to appear.

CITED BY 30

	Cuihong Li , Katia Sycara, Algorithm for combinatorial coalition formation and payoff division in an electronic marketplace, Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1, July 15-19, 2002, Bologna, Italy
	Wolfram Conen , Tuomas Sandholm, Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, p.256-259, October 14-17, 2001, Tampa, Florida, USA
	William E. Walsh , Michael P. Wellman , Fredrik Ygge, Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation, Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.260-269, October 17-20, 2000, Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States
	Wolfram Conen , Tuomas Sandholm, Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1, July 15-19, 2002, Bologna, Italy
	Wolfram Conen , Tuomas Sandholm, Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions, Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence, p.367-372, July 28-August 01, 2002, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
	Wolfram Conen , Tuomas Sandholm, Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
	Athena Vakali , Lefteris Angelis , Dimitra Pournara, Internet based auctions: a survey on models and applications, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, v.2 n.2, p.6-15, Spring, 2001
	Liad Blumrosen , Noam Nisan, On the computational power of iterative auctions, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.29-43, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
	Peter R. Wurman , Gangshu Cai , Ashish Sureka, Computing the outcome of proxy bidding in combinatorial auctions extended abstract, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
	Martin A. Zinkevich , Avrim Blum , Tuomas Sandholm, On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.176-185, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
	Ioannis A. Vetsikas , Bart Selman, A principled study of the design tradeoffs for autonomous trading agents, Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, July 14-18, 2003, Melbourne, Australia
	Peter R. Wurman, Guest Editor's Introduction: Dynamic Pricing in the Virtual Marketplace, IEEE Internet Computing, v.5 n.2, p.36-42, March 2001
	Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm, Expressive negotiation over donations to charities, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, May 17-20, 2004, New York, NY, USA
	Peter R. Wurman , Ganghu Cai , Jie Zhong , Ashish Sureka, An algorithm for computing the outcome of combinatorial auctions with proxy bidding, Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce, p.1-8, September 30-October 03, 2003, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
	Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm, Communication complexity of common voting rules, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.78-87, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
	Terrence Harvey , Keith Decker , Sandra Carberry, Multi-agent decision support via user-modeling, Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, July 25-29, 2005, The Netherlands
	David C. Parkes , Ruggiero Cavallo , Nick Elprin , Adam Juda , Sébastien Lahaie , Benjamin Lubin , Loizos Michael , Jeffrey Shneidman , Hassan Sultan, ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.249-258, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
	Ashish Sureka , Peter R. Wurman, Using tabu best-response search to find pure strategy nash equilibria in normal form games, Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, July 25-29, 2005, The Netherlands
	Peter R. Wurman , Michael P. Wellman , William E. Walsh, Specifying rules for electronic auctions, AI Magazine, v.23 n.3, p.15-23, Fall 2002
	Natalia López , Manuel Núñez , Ismael Rodríguez , Fernando Rubio, Improving privacy in Vickrey auctions, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, v.5 n.1, p.1-12, July, 2004
	Avrim Blum , Jeffrey Jackson , Tuomas Sandholm , Martin Zinkevich, Preference Elicitation and Query Learning, The Journal of Machine Learning Research, 5, p.649-667, 12/1/2004
	Riikka-Leena Leskelä , Jeffrey Teich , Hannele Wallenius , Jyrki Wallenius, Decision support for multi-unit combinatorial bundle auctions, Decision Support Systems, v.43 n.2, p.420-434, March, 2007
	Shantanu Biswas , Y. Narahari, Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, v.44 n.3, p.185-205, July 2005
	Wolfram Conen , Tuomas Sandholm, Anonymous Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, p.254-260, July 19-23, 2004, New York, New York
	Benoit Hudson , Tuomas Sandholm, Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, p.386-393, July 19-23, 2004, New York, New York
	Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm , Paolo Santi, Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations, Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence, p.248-254, July 09-13, 2005, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
	Martin Bichler , Pasha Shabalin , Alexander Pikovsky, A Computational Analysis of Linear Price Iterative Combinatorial Auction Formats, Information Systems Research, v.20 n.1, p.33-59, March 2009
	William E. Walsh , Michael P. Wellman, Decentralized supply chain formation: a market protocol and competitive equilibrium analysis, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, v.19 n.1, p.513-567, July 2003
	Benjamin Lubin , Adam I. Juda , Ruggiero Cavallo , Sébastien Lahaie , Jeffrey Shneidman , David C. Parkes, ICE: an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, v.33 n.1, p.33-77, September 2008
	Thomas Sandholm, Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing, Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence, p.1649-1671, August 09-15, 2003, Acapulco, Mexico