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Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States
Pages: 1 - 12  
Year of Publication: 2000
ISBN:1-58113-272-7
Author
Noam Nisan  Institute of Computer Science, Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Sponsor
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 12,   Downloads (12 Months): 62,   Citation Count: 87
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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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