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Random oracles in constantipole: practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography (extended abstract)
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing archive
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing table of contents
Portland, Oregon, United States
Pages: 123 - 132  
Year of Publication: 2000
ISBN:1-58113-183-6
Authors
Christian Cachin  IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory, CH-8803 Rüschlikon, Switzerland
Klaus Kursawe  IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory, CH-8803 Rüschlikon, Switzerland
Victor Shoup  IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory, CH-8803 Rüschlikon, Switzerland
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Byzantine agreement requires a set of parties in a distributed system to agree on a value even if some parties are corrupted. A new protocol for Byzantine agreement in a completely asynchronous network is presented that makes use of cryptography, specifically of threshold signatures and coin-tossing protocols. These cryptographic protocols have practical and provably secure implementations in the “random oracle” model. In particular, a coin-tossing protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is presented and analyzed. The resulting asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is both practical and nearly matches the known theoretical lower bounds. More precisely, it tolerates the maximum number of corrupted parties, runs in constant expected time, has message and communication complexity close to the maximum, and uses a trusted dealer only in a setup phase, after which it can process a virtually unlimited number of transactions. Novel dual-threshold variants of both cryptographic protocols are used. The protocol is formulated as a transaction processing service in a cryptographic security model, which differs from the standard information-theoretic formalization and may be of independent interest.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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CITED BY  13

Collaborative Colleagues:
Christian Cachin: colleagues
Klaus Kursawe: colleagues
Victor Shoup: colleagues