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Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
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Source Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
Denver, Colorado, United States
Pages: 129 - 139  
Year of Publication: 1999
ISBN:1-58113-176-3
Authors
Moni Naor  Dept. of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel
Benny Pinkas  Dept. of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel
Reuban Sumner  Dept. of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel
Sponsor
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 17,   Downloads (12 Months): 113,   Citation Count: 48
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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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O. Goldreich, Secure Multi-Party Computation (working draft) Version 1.1, 1998. Available at http://philby.ucsd.edu/books.html
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M. Harkavy, J. D.Tygar and H. Kikuchi, "Electronic auctions with private bids", 3rd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, pp. 61-73, 1999.
 
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Q. Huai and T. Sandholm, "Mobile Agents in an Electronic Auction House", Mobile Agents in the Context of Competition and Cooperation (MAC3-workshop), 1999.
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N. Kfir-Dahav, D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz, "Mechanism design for resource bounded agents", 1998.
 
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CITED BY  48

Collaborative Colleagues:
Moni Naor: colleagues
Benny Pinkas: colleagues
Reuban Sumner: colleagues