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Source International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents table of contents
Barcelona, Spain
Pages: 341 - 348  
Year of Publication: 2000
ISBN:1-58113-230-1
Author
Tuomas Sandholm  Department of Computer Science, Washington University, St. Louis, MO
Sponsors
SIGGRAPH: ACM Special Interest Group on Computer Graphics and Interactive Techniques
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
SIGCHI: ACM Special Interest Group on Computer-Human Interaction
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 5,   Downloads (12 Months): 17,   Citation Count: 30
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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
L. M. Ansubel and P. C. Cramton. Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions. Technical Report 96-07, U. Maryland, Dept. of Economics.
 
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E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17-33, 1971.
 
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T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617-631, 1973.
 
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M. M. Halldorsson and H. C. Lau. Low-degree graph partitioning via local search with applications to constraint satisfaction, max cut, and 3-coloring. Journal of Graph Algo. Applic., 1(3):1-13, 1997.
 
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D. S. Hochbaum. Efficient bounds for the stable set, vertex cover, and set packing problems. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 6:243-254, 1983.
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11
W. A. Lupien and J. T. Rickard. Crossing network utilizing optimal mutual satisfaction density profile. US Patent 5,689,652, granted Nov. 18, 1997.
 
12
J. McMillan. Selling spectrum rights. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(3):145-162, 1994.
 
13
H. Raiffa. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.
 
14
E. Rasmusen. Games and Information. Basil Blackwell, 1989.
 
15
S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfm. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. of Economics, 13:402-417, 1982.
 
16
J. A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, P. Noriega, C. Sierra, and J. Padget. FM96.5: A Java-based electronic auction house. In PAAM, 1997.
 
17
 
18
T. W. Sandholm. An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal cost calculations. In AAAI, pages 256-262, Washington, D.C., July 1993.
 
19
T. W. Sandholm. Limitations of the Vickrey auction in computational multiagent systems. In ICMAS, pages 299-306, Keihanna Plaza, Kyoto, Japan, 1996.
 
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21
T. W. Sandholm and V. Ferrandon. Safe exchange planner. In ICMAS, Boston, MA, 2000. To appear.
 
22
T. W. Sandholm and V. Lesser. Equihbrium analysis of the possibilities of unenforced exchange in multiagent systems. In IJCAI, 694-701, Montreal, 1995.
 
23
T. W. Sandholm and V. R. Lesser. Advantages of a leveled commitment contracting protocol. In AAAI, pages 126-133, Portland, OR, 1996.
 
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T. W. Sandholm and S. Suri. Improved algorithms for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. 2000. Submitted.
 
26
W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8-37, 1961.
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CITED BY  30