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REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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CITED BY 29
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Andrew V. Goldberg , Jason D. Hartline , Andrew Wright, Competitive auctions and digital goods, Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p.735-744, January 07-09, 2001, Washington, D.C., United States
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Nikhil R. Devanur , Milena Mihail , Vijay V. Vazirani, Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.108-114, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
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Amos Fiat , Andrew V. Goldberg , Jason D. Hartline , Anna R. Karlin, Competitive generalized auctions, Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, May 19-21, 2002, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
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Chandra Chekuri , Julia Chuzhoy , Liane Lewin-Eytan , Joseph (Seffi) Naor , Ariel Orda, Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games, Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.72-81, June 11-15, 2006, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
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