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Sharing the cost of muliticast transmissions (preliminary version)
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Portland, Oregon, United States
Pages: 218 - 227  
Year of Publication: 2000
ISBN:1-58113-184-4
Authors
Joan Feigenbaum  AT&T Labs - Research, 180 Park Ave., C203, Florham Park, NJ
Christos Papadimitriou  Computer Science Dept., U. C. Berkeley, Berkeley, CA
Scott Shenker  ACIRI/ICSI, 1947 Center Street, Suite 600, Berkeley, CA
Sponsor
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 42,   Citation Count: 29
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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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E. H. Clarke, Multipart pricing of public goods, Public Choice 11 (1971), 17-33.
 
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P. Dasgupta, P. Hammond, and E. Maskin, The implementation of social choice rules, Review of Economics Studies 46 (1979), 185-216.
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D. Ferguson, C. Nikolaou, and Y. Yemini, An economy for flow control in computer networks, in "Proceedings of the 8th Infocom," pp. 100-118, IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, 1989.
 
7
E. Friedman and S. Shenker, "Learning and Implementation in the Internet," preprint, 1997. Available at ht tp: //www. ac ir i. org/shenk er/decent, ps
 
8
A. V. Goldberg, J. D. Hartline, and A. Wright, "Competitive Auctions and Digital Goods," InterTrust Technical Report 99-01. Available at http: //www. intertrust, corn/st ar/tr/t r-99-01, html
 
9
J. Green, E. Kohlberg, and J. J. Lattont, Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem, Journal of Public Economics 6 (1976), 375-394.
 
10
J. Green and J. J. Laffont, Incentives in public decision making, in "Studies in Public Economics," pp. 65-78, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1979, Vol. 1.
 
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T. Groves, Incentives in teams, Econometrica 41 (1973), 617-663.
 
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T. Groves and J. Ledyard, Incentive compatibility since 1972, in "Information, Incentives, and Economics Mechanisms," pp. 48-111, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987.
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Y. Korilis, A. A. Lazar, and A. Orda, Architecting noncooperative networks, Journal or, Selected Areas in Communications 13 (1995), 1241-1251.
 
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E. Maskin, The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium, in "Social Goals and Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner," pp. 173-204, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1985.
 
20
N. Megiddo, Computational complexity of the game theory approach to cost allocation for a tree, Mathematics of Operations Research 3 (1978), 189-196.
 
21
H. Moulin, Incremental cost sharing; characterization by strategyproofness, Social Choice and Welfare 16 (1999), 279-320.
 
22
H. Moulin and S. Shenker, "Strategyproof Sharing nof Submodular Costs: Budget Balance Versus Efficiency," to appear in Economic Theory. Available in preprint form at http://www, aciri, org/shenker/cost, ps
 
23
N. Nisan, Algorithms for selfish agents, in "Proceedings of 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science," pp. 1-17, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1563.
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M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1994.
 
26
R. Perlman, (2.-Y. Lee, A. Ballardie, J. Crowcroft., Z. Wang, T. Maufer, C. Diot, and M. Green, Simple multicast: A design for simple low-overhead multicast, iETF Internet Draft (Work in Progress), 1999.
 
27
K. Roberts, The Characterization of Implementable Choice Rules, in "Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences,'' pp. 321-348, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1979.
 
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L. S. Shapley, A value for n-person games, in "Contributions to the Theory of Games," pp. 31-40, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1953.
 
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M. Shubik, Incentives, decentralized controls, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing, Management Science 8 (1962), 325-343.
 
35
W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance 16 (1961), 8- 37.
 
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CITED BY  29

Collaborative Colleagues:
Joan Feigenbaum: colleagues
Christos Papadimitriou: colleagues
Scott Shenker: colleagues