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An approach to the formal verification of the two-party cryptographic protocols
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Volume 33 ,  Issue 4  (October 1999) table of contents
Pages: 48 - 51  
Year of Publication: 1999
ISSN:0163-5980
Authors
Yuqing Zhang  State Key Lab on ISN, Xidian University, Xi'an, 710071, P. R. China, Institute of Information Security, Xidian University, Xi'an, 710071, P. R. China
Jihong Li  State Key Lab on ISN, Xidian University, Xi'an, 710071, P. R. China, Institute of Information Security, Xidian University, Xi'an, 710071, P. R. China
Guozhen Xiao  State Key Lab on ISN, Xidian University, Xi'an, 710071, P. R. China, Institute of Information Security, Xidian University, Xi'an, 710071, P. R. China
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A general method, which can be used to verify the two-party cryptographic protocols, is present in this paper. Our approach makes use of running modes of the two-party cryptographic protocols to analyze the protocols. Based on this method, the verification of the protocols becomes independent of model checking tools. Finally, this approach is illustrated with an example on the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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[3] Z. Dang and R. A. Kemmerer. Using the ASTRAL Model Checker for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis. In Proceedings of the DIMACS Workshop on Design and Formal Verification of Security Protocols, 1997. Available via URL: http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Security/program2/program.html.
 
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[6] Volker Kessler and Gabriele Wedel. AUTLOG--An advanced logic of authentication. In Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop VII. IEEE Computer Society Press, 90-99, 1994.
 
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[8] G. Lowe, Towards a completeness result for model checking of security protocols. Technical Report 1998/6, Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Leicester, 1998. Available from http://www.mcs.le.ac.uk/~glowe/Security/Papers/completeness.ps.gz.
 
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[10] W. Marrero, E. Clarke, and S. Jha. A model checker for authentication protocols. In Proceedings of the DIMACS Workshop on Design and Formal Verification of Security Protocols, 1997. Available via URL: http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Security/program2/program.html.
 
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[13] SMV. Available via URL: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~modelcheck/.
 
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[15] Yuqing Zhang, Kai Chen, and Guozhen Xiao. Automated Analysis of Cryptographic Protocol Using SMV. In Proceedings of International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99), July 1999.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Yuqing Zhang: colleagues
Jihong Li: colleagues
Guozhen Xiao: colleagues