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Transforming out timing leaks
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Source Annual Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages archive
Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages table of contents
Boston, MA, USA
Pages: 40 - 53  
Year of Publication: 2000
ISBN:1-58113-125-9
Author
Johan Agat  Department of Computing Science, Chalmers University of Technology and Göteborg University
Sponsors
SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 7,   Downloads (12 Months): 45,   Citation Count: 29
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ABSTRACT

One aspect of security in mobile code is privacy: private (or secret) data should not be leaked to unauthorised agents. Most of the work on secure information flow has until recently only been concerned with detecting direct and indirect flows. Secret information can however be leaked to the attacker also through covert channels. It is very reasonable to assume that the attacker, even as an external observer, can monitor the timing (including termination) behaviour of the program. Thus to claim a program secure, the security analysis must take also these into account. In this work we present a surprisingly simple solution to the problem of detecting timing leakages to external observers. Our system consists of a type system in which well-typed programs do not leak secret information directly, indirectly or through timing, and a transformation for removing timing leakages. For any program that is well typed according to Volpano and Smith [VS97a], our transformation generates a program that is also free of timing leaks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
BBL94
DD77
Den76
 
DFWB97
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Koc96
 
McC87
D. McCullough. Specifications for multi-level security and hook-up property. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 161-166. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1987.
Mog89
Mye99
 
Nie84
H.R. Nielson. Hoare Logic's for Run-time Analysis of Programs. Ph.D. thesis, CST-30-84, Edinburgh University, 1984.
 
RLJ98
 
RT96
 
SS99
A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multithreaded programs. Unpublished (ht t p://www, cs. chalmers.se/" dave/papers/probsabelfeld-sands.ps), June; Revised October 1999.
SV98
 
VS97a
 
VS97b
 
VS98
 
VSI96

CITED BY  29