ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Digital Library logoTake a look at the new version of this page: [ beta version ]. Tell us what you think.
Authentication metric analysis and design
Full text PdfPdf (154 KB)
Source ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 2 ,  Issue 2  (May 1999) table of contents
Pages: 138 - 158  
Year of Publication: 1999
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
Michael K. Reiter  Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, NJ
Stuart G. Stubblebine  Cert Co., New York, NY
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 9,   Downloads (12 Months): 71,   Citation Count: 19
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   review   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/317087.317088
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

Authentication using a path of trusted intermediaries, each able to authenicate the next in the path, is a well-known technique for authenicating entities in a large-scale system. Recent work has extended this technique to include multiple paths in an effort to bolster authentication, but the success of this approach may be unclear in the face of intersecting paths, ambiguities in the meaning of certificates, and interdependencies in the use of different keys. Thus, several authors have proposed metrics to evaluate the confidence afforded by a set of paths. In this paper we develop a set of guiding principles for the design of such metrics. We motivate our principles by showing how previous approaches failed with respect to these principles and what the consequences to authentication might be. We then propose a new metric that appears to meet our principles, and so to be a satisfactory metric of authenticaiton.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
BIRRELL, A. D., LAMPSON, B. W., NEEDHAM, R. M., AND SCHROEDER, M. D. 1986. A global authentication service without global trust. In Proceedings of the 1986 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA, Apr. 7-9, 1986). IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 223-230.
 
6
FORD, L. R. JR. AND FULKERSON, D. R. 1956. Maximal flow through a network. Can. J. Math. 8, 399-404.
 
7
 
8
GASSER, M., GOLDSTEIN, A., KAUFMAN, C., AND LAMPSON, B. 1989. The digital distributed system security architecture. In Proceedings of the 12th NIST/NCSC National Conference on Computer Security (Gaithersburg, MD, Oct.). 305-319.
 
9
10
11
 
12
13
14
 
15
LAWLER, E. L. 1976. Combinatorial Optimization: Networks and Matroids. Holt Rinehart & Winston, Inc./School Division, Austin, TX.
 
16
LEVIEN, R. AND AIKEN, A. 1998. Attack-resistant trust metrics for public key certification. In Proceedings of the 7th on USENIX Security Symposium (Jan.). USENIX Assoc., Berkeley, CA, 229 -241.
 
17
 
18
 
19
 
20
 
21
 
22
 
23
TARDO, J. J. AND ALAGAPPAN, K. 1991. PX: Global authentication using public key certificates. In Proceedings of the 1991 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy (May). IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 232-244.
 
24
ITT CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (CCITT), 1988. The Directory--Authentication Framework, Recommendation X.509.
 
25
ANSI X9F1, 1994. ANSI X9.45 Enhanced Management Controls Using Attribute Certificates (draft).
 
26
 
27

CITED BY  19


REVIEW

"Anthony Donald Vanker : Reviewer"

This paper addresses the issue of determining the owner of a public key or, on the other hand, determining a user's public key in order to encrypt data for secure transmission. In most real-life situations that involve different ad  more...

Collaborative Colleagues:
Michael K. Reiter: colleagues
Stuart G. Stubblebine: colleagues