ACM Portal
  Subscribe (Full Service)    Register (Limited Service, Free)    Login
  Search:   The ACM Digital Library   The Guide
  
ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
Full text PdfPdf (1.02 MB)
Source Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Atlanta, Georgia, United States
Pages: 129 - 140  
Year of Publication: 1999
ISBN:1-58113-067-8
Authors
Noam Nisan  Institute of Computer Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Scholl of Computer Science, IDC, Herzliya
Amir Ronen  Institute of Computer Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Sponsor
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 9,   Downloads (12 Months): 107,   Citation Count: 113
Additional Information:

references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/301250.301287
What is a DOI?

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
E. H. Clarke. Multipart, pricing of public goods. Public Choice, pages 17-33, 1971.
 
2
Eit, han Ephrati and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. The clarke toax as a concensus mechanism among automated agents. In Proceedings of the national Conference on Artificial Intelli#ence, pages 173-178, July 1991.
 
3
Donald F. Ferguson , Christos Nikolaou , Jakka Sairamesh , Yechiam Yemini, Economic models for allocating resources in computer systems, Market-based control: a paradigm for distributed resource allocation, World Scientific Publishing Co., Inc., River Edge, NJ, 1996
 
4
3. Green and J.3. Latfont. Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods. Econometrica, pages 427-438, 1977.
 
5
T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, pages 617-631, 1973.
 
6
M. H. Rothkopf , A. Pekec , R. M. Harstad, Computationally Manageable Combinatorial Auctions, Certer for Discrete Mathematics & Theoretical Computer Science, 1995
 
7
Dorit S. Hochbaum, Approximation algorithms for NP-hard problems, PWS Publishing Co., Boston, MA, 1996
8
Ellis Horowitz , Sartaj Sahni, Exact and Approximate Algorithms for Scheduling Nonidentical Processors, Journal of the ACM (JACM), v.23 n.2, p.317-327, April 1976  [doi>10.1145/321941.321951]
 
9
Brnardo A. Huberman and Tad Hogg. Distributed computation as an economic system. Journal of Economic Perspectives, pages 141-152, 1995.
 
10
Y.A KoriIis, A. A. Lazar, and A. Orda. Architecting noncooperative networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication (Special Issue on Advances in the ~undamentals o.f Networkin#), 13(7):1241-125/, September 1991.
11
Leslie Lamport , Robert Shostak , Marshall Pease, The Byzantine Generals Problem, ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS), v.4 n.3, p.382-401, July 1982  [doi>10.1145/357172.357176]
 
12
A.A. Lazar and N. Semret. The progressive second price auction mechanism for network resource sharing. In 8th International Symposium on Dynamic Games, Maa~stricht,, The Netherlands, July 1998.
 
13
Daniel Lehmann. Private communication, 1999.
 
14
Jan Karel Lenstra, David B. Shmoys, and Eva Tart dos. Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines. In ~Sth Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 217-224. II~EE, 1987.
 
15
Na;han Lineal. Game theoretic aspects of computing. In Handbook of Game Theory, volume 2, pages 1339- 1395. Elsevier Science Dubhshers B.V, t994.
 
16
A. Mas-Collel, Whinston W. and J, Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford tmiversi{y press, 1995.
 
17
J. McMillan. Selling spectrum rights. Journal oj~ Economic Perspectives, pages 145-i62, 1994.
 
18
Marke~, design inc. Web Page: http://www.market.- design.com.
 
19
Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenhottz. Distributed games. To appear in Games and Economic Behaviour.
 
20
Noam Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. To appear in Proceedings of the I6th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STAGS99), Trier, Germany, March 1999.
 
21
Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Available via: http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/amity/.
 
22
M. J. Osborne and A. Rubistein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT press, 1994.
 
23
Christos H. Papadimitriou, Computational Aspacts of Organization Theory (Extended Abstract), Proceedings of the Fourth Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, p.559-564, September 25-27, 1996
24
Christos H. Papadimitriou , Mihalis Yannakakis, On the value of information in distributed decision-making (extended abstract), Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, p.61-64, August 19-21, 1991, Montreal, Quebec, Canada  [doi>10.1145/112600.112606]
25
Christos H. Papadimitriou , Mihalis Yannakakis, Linear programming without the matrix, Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, p.121-129, May 16-18, 1993, San Diego, California, United States  [doi>10.1145/167088.167127]
 
26
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein , Gilad Zlotkin, Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994
 
27
Tuomas W. Sandholm. Limitations of the vickrey auction in computational multoiagen~ systems. In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Multiagent Systems (ICMAS-96), pages 299-306, Keihanna Plaza, Kyoto, Japan, December 1996.
28
S. Shenker , D. Clark , D. Estrin , S. Herzog, Pricing in computer networks: reshaping the research agenda, ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, v.26 n.2, p.19-43, April 1996  [doi>10.1145/231699.231703]
 
29
Yoav Shoham and Katsumi Tanaka. A dynamic theory of incentives in multi-agent systems (preliminary report). In Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, pages 626- 631, August 1997.
 
30
W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, pages 8-37, i96t.
 
31
William E. Walsh , Michael P. Wellman, A Market Protocol for Decentralized Task Allocation, Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Multi Agent Systems, p.325, July 03-07, 1998
 
32
W.E. Walsh, M.P. Wellman, P.R. Wurman, and J.K. MacKie-Mason. Auction protocols for decen~ralized scheduling. In Proceedings of The Eighteenth International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS-98), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1998.

CITED BY  113
Kamal Jain , Vijay Vazirani, Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games, Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, p.364-372, July 2001, Hersonissos, Greece
Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm, Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, May 17-20, 2004, New York, NY, USA
Tim Roughgarden, Stackelberg scheduling strategies, Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, p.104-113, July 2001, Hersonissos, Greece
Christos Papadimitriou, Algorithms, games, and the internet, Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, p.749-753, July 2001, Hersonissos, Greece
Amir Ronen, Mechanism design with incomplete languages, Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, p.105-114, October 14-17, 2001, Tampa, Florida, USA
Andrew V. Goldberg , Jason D. Hartline , Andrew Wright, Competitive auctions and digital goods, Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p.735-744, January 07-09, 2001, Washington, D.C., United States
Evangelos Markakis , Amin Saberi, On the core of the multicommodity flow game, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.93-97, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
Moni Naor , Benny Pinkas , Reuban Sumner, Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design, Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.129-139, November 03-05, 1999, Denver, Colorado, United States
Moshe Tennenholtz, Competitive safety analysis, Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence, p.404-409, July 28-August 01, 2002, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Ron Lavi , Noam Nisan, Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions, Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.233-241, October 17-20, 2000, Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States
Daniel Lehmann , Liadan Ita Oćallaghan , Yoav Shoham, Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions, Journal of the ACM (JACM), v.49 n.5, p.577-602, September 2002
Noam Nisan, Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.1-12, October 17-20, 2000, Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States
Daniel Lehmann , Liaden Ita O'Callaghan , Yoav Shoham, Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.96-102, November 03-05, 1999, Denver, Colorado, United States
Ziv Bar-Yossef , Kirsten Hildrum , Felix Wu, Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods, Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p.964-970, January 06-08, 2002, San Francisco, California
Michel Goemans , Li Erran Li , Vahab S. Mirrokni , Marina Thottan, Market sharing games applied to content distribution in ad-hoc networks, Proceedings of the 5th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing, May 24-26, 2004, Roppongi Hills, Tokyo, Japan
Aaron Archer , Christos Papadimitriou , Kunal Talwar , Éva Tardos, An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents, Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, January 12-14, 2003, Baltimore, Maryland
Aaron Archer , Éva Tardos, Frugal path mechanisms, Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p.991-999, January 06-08, 2002, San Francisco, California
Baruch Awerbuch , Yossi Azar , Adam Meyerson, Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization, Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, June 09-11, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
Aranyak Mehta , Scott Shenker , Vijay V. Vazirani, Profit-maximizing multicast pricing by approximating fixed points [Extended Abstract], Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
Aranyak Mehta , Scott Shenker , Vijay V. Vazirani, Posted price profit maximization for multicast by approximating fixed points, Journal of Algorithms, v.58 n.2, p.150-164, February 2006
Alon Altman , Moshe Tennenholtz, Ranking systems: the PageRank axioms, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.1-8, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Ron Lavi , Noam Nisan, Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions, Theoretical Computer Science, v.310 n.1-3, p.159-180, 01 January 2004
Andrew Lomonosov , Meera Sitharam , Kihong Park, Stability vs optimality tradeoff in game theoretic mechanisms for QoS provision, Proceedings of the 2003 ACM symposium on Applied computing, March 09-12, 2003, Melbourne, Florida
Vincenzo Auletta , Roberto De Prisco , Paolo Penna , Pino Persiano, How to route and tax selfish unsplittable traffic, Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures, June 27-30, 2004, Barcelona, Spain
Alan Holland , Barry O'Sullivan, Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming, Artificial Intelligence Review, v.21 n.3-4, p.335-352, June 2004
Ahuva Mu'alem , Noam Nisan, Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract, Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence, p.379-384, July 28-August 01, 2002, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Enrico Nardelli , Guido Proietti , Peter Widmayer, Finding the most vital node of a shortest path, Theoretical Computer Science, v.296 n.1, p.167-177, 4 March 2003
Yair Bartal , Rica Gonen , Pierfrancesco La Mura, Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, May 17-20, 2004, New York, NY, USA
Jeffrey Shneidman , David C. Parkes, Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes, Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, July 25-28, 2004, St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada
WeiZhao Wang , Xiang-Yang Li , Yu Wang, Truthful multicast routing in selfish wireless networks, Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking, September 26-October 01, 2004, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Moni Naor, Cryptography and mechanism design, Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge, July 08-10, 2001, Siena, Italy
Yair Bartal , Rica Gonen , Noam Nisan, Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge, June 20-22, 2003, Univerity of Indiana, Indiana
Andrew Lomonosov , Meera Sitharam , Kihong Park, Network QoS games: stability vs optimality tradeoff, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, v.69 n.2, p.281-302, September 2004
Andreas Tanner , Michael A. Jaeger, Pricing in publish/subscribe systems, Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Electronic commerce, October 25-27, 2004, Delft, The Netherlands
Amos Fiat , Andrew V. Goldberg , Jason D. Hartline , Anna R. Karlin, Competitive generalized auctions, Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, May 19-21, 2002, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Edith Elkind , Amit Sahai , Ken Steiglitz, Frugality in path auctions, Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, January 11-14, 2004, New Orleans, Louisiana
Andrew V. Goldberg , Jason D. Hartline, Competitiveness via consensus, Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, January 12-14, 2003, Baltimore, Maryland
Éva Tardos, Network games, Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, p.341-342, June 13-16, 2004, Chicago, IL, USA
Jeffrey Shneidman , David C. Parkes , Laurent Massoulié, Faithfulness in internet algorithms, Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems, September 03-03, 2004, Portland, Oregon, USA
Evangelos Markakis , Amin Saberi, On the core of the multicommodity flow game, Decision Support Systems, v.39 n.1, p.3-10, March 2005
Nikhil R. Devanur , Milena Mihail , Vijay V. Vazirani, Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games, Decision Support Systems, v.39 n.1, p.11-22, March 2005
Thomas C. O'Connell , Richard E. Stearns, Mechanism design for software agents with complete information, Decision Support Systems, v.39 n.2, p.197-217, April 2005
Edith Elkind, True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.108-116, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Nicole Immorlica , Mohammad Mahdian, Marriage, honesty, and stability, Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, January 23-25, 2005, Vancouver, British Columbia
Michal Feldman , John Chuang , Ion Stoica , Scott Shenker, Hidden-action in multi-hop routing, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.117-126, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Ming-Yang Kao , Xiang-Yang Li , WeiZhao Wang, Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.213-222, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Micah Adler , Dan Rubenstein, Pricing multicasting in more flexible network models, ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG), v.1 n.1, p.48-73, July 2005
David D. Clark , John Wroclawski , Karen R. Sollins , Robert Braden, Tussle in cyberspace: defining tomorrow's internet, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), v.13 n.3, p.462-475, June 2005
Chaki Ng , Philip Buonadonna , Brent N. Chun , Alex C. Snoeren , Amin Vahdat, Addressing strategic behavior in a deployed microeconomic resource allocator, Proceeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems, August 22-22, 2005, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
Pradeep Kyasanur , Nitin H. Vaidya, Selfish MAC Layer Misbehavior in Wireless Networks, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, v.4 n.5, p.502-516, September 2005
Dov Monderer , Moshe Tennenholtz, k-Implementation, Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.19-28, June 09-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA
Patrick Briest , Piotr Krysta, Single-minded unlimited supply pricing on sparse instances, Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm, p.1093-1102, January 22-26, 2006, Miami, Florida
Patrick Briest , Piotr Krysta , Berthold Vöcking, Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design, Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, May 22-24, 2005, Baltimore, MD, USA
Michal Feldman , John Chuang, Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, v.5 n.4, p.41-50, July, 2005
Andrew V. Goldberg , Jason D. Hartline, Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents, Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, January 23-25, 2005, Vancouver, British Columbia
Jason D. Hartline , Robert McGrew, From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions, Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.175-182, June 05-08, 2005, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Thomas Moscibroda , Stefan Schmid , Roger Wattenhofer, When selfish meets evil: byzantine players in a virus inoculation game, Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, July 23-26, 2006, Denver, Colorado, USA
Shahar Dobzinski , Noam Nisan , Michael Schapira, Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, May 21-23, 2006, Seattle, WA, USA
Christoph Ambühl , Andrea E. F. Clementi , Paolo Penna , Gianluca Rossi , Riccardo Silvestri, On the approximability of the range assignment problem on radio networks in presence of selfish agents, Theoretical Computer Science, v.343 n.1-2, p.27-41, 10 October 2005
A.C. Kaporis , P.G. Spirakis, The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions, Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures, July 30-August 02, 2006, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Milena Mihail , Christos Papadimitriou , Amin Saberi, On certain connectivity properties of the internet topology, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, v.72 n.2, p.239-251, March 2006
Narayanan Sadagopan , Mitali Singh , Bhaskar Krishnamachari, Decentralized utility-based sensor network design, Mobile Networks and Applications, v.11 n.3, p.341-350, June 2006
Nir Andelman , Yishay Mansour, A sufficient condition for truthfulness with single parameter agents, Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.8-17, June 11-15, 2006, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
Joan Feigenbaum , Christos Papadimitriou , Scott Shenker, Sharing the cost of muliticast transmissions (preliminary version), Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, p.218-227, May 21-23, 2000, Portland, Oregon, United States
Richard T. B. Ma , Sam C. M. Lee , John C. S. Lui , David K. Y. Yau, Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theoretic approach, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), v.14 n.5, p.978-991, October 2006
Weizhao Wang , Xiang-Yang Li , Stephan Eidenbenz , Yu Wang, OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks, Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking, September 23-29, 2006, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Moshe Babaioff , Michal Feldman , Noam Nisan, Combinatorial agency, Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, p.18-28, June 11-15, 2006, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
Daniel M. Reeves , Bethany M. Soule , Tejaswi Kasturi, Yootopia!, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, v.6 n.2, p.1-26, January 2007
V. Bilò , M. Flammini , G. Melideo , L. Moscardelli , A. Navarra, Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks, Theoretical Computer Science, v.369 n.1, p.269-284, 15 December 2006
Eric Angel , Evripidis Bampis , Fanny Pascual, Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines, Theoretical Computer Science, v.369 n.1, p.157-168, 15 December 2006
Shahar Dobzinski , Noam Nisan, Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms, Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, June 11-13, 2007, San Diego, California, USA
Jeffrey Shneidman , Chaki Ng , David C. Parkes , Alvin AuYoung , Alex C. Snoeren , Amin Vahdat , Brent Chun, Why markets could (but don't currently) solve resource allocation problems in systems, Proceedings of the 10th conference on Hot Topics in Operating Systems, p.7-7, June 12-15, 2005, Santa Fe, NM
Yu-Kwong Kwok , Kai Hwang , ShanShan Song, Selfish Grids: Game-Theoretic Modeling and NAS/PSA Benchmark Evaluation, IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, v.18 n.5, p.621-636, May 2007
Vincenzo Auletta , Roberto De Prisco , Paolo Penna , Giuseppe Persiano, Routing selfish unsplittable traffic, ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG), v.3 n.4, p.52-es, November 2007
Yogeshwer Sharma , David P. Williamson, Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism, Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 11-15, 2007, San Diego, California, USA
Edith Elkind , Leslie Ann Goldberg , Paul W. Goldberg, Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover, Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, June 11-15, 2007, San Diego, California, USA
Yossi Azar , Iftah Gamzu , Shai Gutner, Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks, Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallel algorithms and architectures, June 09-11, 2007, San Diego, California, USA
Patrick Briest , Piotr Krysta, Buying cheap is expensive: hardness of non-parametric multi-product pricing, Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p.716-725, January 07-09, 2007, New Orleans, Louisiana
Elisabeth Crawford , Manuela Veloso, Mechanism design for multi-agent meeting scheduling, Web Intelligence and Agent System, v.4 n.2, p.209-220, April 2006
Shantanu Biswas , Y. Narahari, Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, v.44 n.3, p.185-205, July 2005
Ofer Dekel , Felix Fischer , Ariel D. Procaccia, Incentive compatible regression learning, Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p.884-893, January 20-22, 2008, San Francisco, California
Ning Chen , Anna R. Karlin, Cheap labor can be expensive, Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p.707-715, January 07-09, 2007, New Orleans, Louisiana
A. C. Kaporis , P. G. Spirakis, The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions, Theoretical Computer Science, v.410 n.8-10, p.745-755, March, 2009
Shahar Dobzinski , Mukund Sundararajan, On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling, Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, July 08-12, 2008, Chicago, Il, USA
Yoav Shoham, Computer science and game theory, Communications of the ACM, v.51 n.8, August 2008
Yu Wang , Teresa A. Dahlberg , Weizhao Wang, Routing game in hybrid wireless mesh networks with selfish mesh clients, International Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive Communications Systems, v.1 n.4, p.425-446, November 2008
George Christodoulou , Elias Koutsoupias , Angelina Vidali, A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms, Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p.1163-1170, January 07-09, 2007, New Orleans, Louisiana
Richard T. B. Ma , Dah ming Chiu , John C. S. Lui , Vishal Misra , Dan Rubenstein, Internet economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement, Proceedings of the 2007 ACM CoNEXT conference, December 10-13, 2007, New York, New York
Matthew C. Cary , Abraham D. Flaxman , Jason D. Hartline , Anna R. Karlin, Auctions for structured procurement, Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, p.304-313, January 20-22, 2008, San Francisco, California
Hadi Otrok , Noman Mohammed , Lingyu Wang , Mourad Debbabi , Prabir Bhattacharya, A game-theoretic intrusion detection model for mobile ad hoc networks, Computer Communications, v.31 n.4, p.708-721, March, 2008
Aviv Zohar , Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Mechanisms for information elicitation, Artificial Intelligence, v.172 n.16-17, p.1917-1939, November, 2008
Xiang-Yang Li , YanWei Wu , Ping Xu , GuiHai Chen , Mo Li, Hidden information and actions in multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks, Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing, May 26-30, 2008, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Antoniy Ganchev , Lata Narayanan , Sunil Shende, Games to induce specified equilibria, Theoretical Computer Science, v.409 n.3, p.341-350, December, 2008
Pasquale Ambrosio , Vincenzo Auletta, Deterministic monotone algorithms for scheduling on related machines, Theoretical Computer Science, v.406 n.3, p.173-186, October, 2008
Vincenzo Auletta , Roberto De Prisco , Paolo Penna , Giuseppe Persiano, The power of verification for one-parameter agents, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, v.75 n.3, p.190-211, May, 2009
Weizhao Wang , Xiang-Yang Li, Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework, Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence, p.1632-1633, July 09-13, 2005, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Michael Wooldridge , Thomas Agotnes , Paul E. Dunne , Wiebe Van der Hoek, Logic for automated mechanism design: a progress report, Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence, p.9-16, July 22-26, 2007, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Liad Blumrosen, Implementing the maximum of monotone algorithms, Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence, p.30-35, July 22-26, 2007, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Federico Mari , Igor Melatti , Ivano Salvo , Enrico Tronci , Lorenzo Alvisi , Allen Clement , Harry Li, Model checking nash equilibria in MAD distributed systems, Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design, p.1-8, November 17-20, 2008, Portland, Oregon
Nikhil R. Devanur , Sham M. Kakade, The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions, Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, July 06-10, 2009, Stanford, California, USA
Nicole Immorlica , Li (Erran) Li , Vahab S. Mirrokni , Andreas S. Schulz, Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling, Theoretical Computer Science, v.410 n.17, p.1589-1598, April, 2009
Paolo Penna , Guido Proietti , Peter Widmayer, Strongly polynomial-time truthful mechanisms in one shot, Theoretical Computer Science, v.410 n.17, p.1607-1615, April, 2009
Changyuan Yu, Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling, Theoretical Computer Science, v.410 n.21-23, p.2196-2206, May, 2009
Marius-Constantin Popescu , Onisifor Olaru , Nikos E. Mastorakis, Equilibrium dynamic systems integration, Proceedings of the 10th WSEAS international conference on Automation & information, p.424-429, March 23-25, 2009, Prague, Czech Republic
Marius-Constantin Popescu , Onisifor Olaru , Nikos Mastorakis, Equilibrium dynamic systems intelligence, WSEAS Transactions on Information Science and Applications, v.6 n.5, p.725-735, May 2009
Itai Ashlagi , Shahar Dobzinski , Ron Lavi, VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, v.8 n.1, p.1-2, July 2009
Itai Ashlagi , Shahar Dobzinski , Ron Lavi, An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms, Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, July 06-10, 2009, Stanford, California, USA
Vincenzo Auletta , Roberto De Prisco , Paolo Penna , Giuseppe Persiano, On designing truthful mechanisms for online scheduling, Theoretical Computer Science, v.410 n.36, p.3348-3356, August, 2009
Paolo Penna , Carmine Ventre, Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification, Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, July 06-10, 2009, Stanford, California, USA
Dov Monderer , Moshe Tennenholtz, K-implementation, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, v.21 n.1, p.37-62, January 2004
Moshe Babaioff , Noam Nisan, Concurrent auctions across the supply chain, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, v.21 n.1, p.595-629, January 2004
Noam Nisan , Amir Ronen, Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, v.29 n.1, p.19-47, May 2007
Moshe Tennenholtz, Competitive safety analysis: robust decision-making in multi-agent systems, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, v.17 n.1, p.363-378, July 2002

INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS

Additional Classification:
  D. Software
  D.4 OPERATING SYSTEMS
      D.4.7 Organization and Design
          Subjects: Distributed systems

  F. Theory of Computation
  F.2 ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS AND PROBLEM COMPLEXITY
      F.2.2 Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems
          Subjects: Computations on discrete structures; Sequencing and scheduling

  G. Mathematics of Computing
  G.2 DISCRETE MATHEMATICS

  H. Information Systems
  H.2 DATABASE MANAGEMENT
      H.2.4 Systems
          Subjects: Distributed databases


General Terms:
Algorithms, Design, Measurement, Performance, Theory, Verification

Collaborative Colleagues:
Noam Nisan: colleagues
Amir Ronen: colleagues

The ACM Portal is published by the Association for Computing Machinery. Copyright © 2009 ACM, Inc.
Terms of Usage   Privacy Policy   Code of Ethics   Contact Us

Useful downloads: Adobe Acrobat    QuickTime    Windows Media Player    Real Player