Anytime coalition structure generation

Subscribe (Full Service)


	Search: The ACM Digital Library The Guide

	Feedback

Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study

Full text

Pdf (911 KB)

Source

International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents table of contents

Seattle, Washington, United States

Pages: 40 - 47

Year of Publication: 1999

ISBN:1-58113-066-X

Authors

Kate S. Larson	Washington Univ., St. Louis, MO
Tuomas W. Sandholm	Washington Univ., St. Louis, MO

Sponsors

SIGGRAPH: ACM Special Interest Group on Computer Graphics and Interactive Techniques
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
SIGCHI: ACM Special Interest Group on Computer-Human Interaction

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 10, Downloads (12 Months): 31, Citation Count: 3

Additional Information:

references cited by index terms collaborative colleagues

Tools and Actions:	Review this Article Save this Article to a Binder Display Formats: BibTeX EndNote ACM Ref

DOI Bookmark:	Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/301136.301158 What is a DOI?

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	R. Aumarm. Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games, volume IV of Contributions to the Theory of Games. Princeton University Press, 1959.
	2	B. D. Bernheim, B. Peleg, and M. D. Whinston. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria: I concepts. Journal of Economic Theory, 42(1):1-12, June 1987.
	3	K. Chatterjee, B. Dutta, D. Ray, and K. Sengupta. A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining. Review of Economic Studies, 60:463-477, 1993.
	4	Rajat Deb , Shlomo Weber , Eyal Winter, The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games, International Journal of Game Theory, v.25 n.2, p.189-198, 1996 [doi>10.1007/BF01247101]
	5	R. Evans. Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers. Games and Economic Behavior, 19:211- 220, 1997.
	6	J. P. Kahan and A. Rapoport. Theories of Coalition Formation. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1984.
	7	Steven Ketchpel, Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards, Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1), p.414-419, October 1994, Seattle, Washington, United States
	8	A. Okada. A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers. Games and Economic Behavior, 16:97-108, 1996.
	9	H. Raiffa. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.
	10	A. Rubinstein. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50:97-109, 1982.
	11	Tuomas Wilhelm Sandholm , Victor R. Lesser, Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents, 1996
	12	T. W. Sandholm. An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Technical Report WUCS-99-01, Washington University, Department of Computer Science, 1999.
	13	Tuomas Sandholm , Kate Larson , Martin Andersson , Onn Shehory , Fernando Tohmé, Anytime coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees, Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence, p.46-53, July 1998, Madison, Wisconsin, United States
	14	T. W. Sandholm , V. R. Lesser, Advantages of a Leveled Commitment Contracting Protocol, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, 1995
	15	Tuomas W. Sandholm , Victor R. Lesser, Coalitions among computationally bounded agents, Artificial Intelligence, v.94 n.1-2, p.99-137, July 1997 [doi>10.1016/S0004-3702(97)00030-1]
	16	Tuomas W. Sandholm , Victor R. Lesser, Coalitions among computationally bounded agents, Artificial Intelligence, v.94 n.1-2, p.99-137, July 1997 [doi>10.1016/S0004-3702(97)00030-1]
	17	L. S. Shapley. A Value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, editors, Contributions to the Theory of Games, volume 2 of Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28, pages 307-317. Princeton University Press, 1953.
	18	O. Shehory and S. Kraus. Task allocation via coalition formation among autonomous agents. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAD, pages 655-661, Montreal, Canada, Aug. 1995.
	19	O. Shehory and S. Kraus. A kernel-oriented model for coalition-formation in general environments: Implemetation and results. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAD, pages 134-140, Portland, OR, Aug. 1996.
	20	R, E. Stearns. Convergent transfer schemes for n-person games. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 134:449-459, 1968.
	21	F. Tohm~ and T. W. Sandholm. Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded rational self-interested agents. In IJCAI Workshop on Social Interaction and Communityware, pages 43-51, Nagoya, Japan, Aug. 1997.
	22	L. S. Wu. A dynamic theory for the class of games with nonempty cores. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 32:328-338, 1977.
	23	Gilad Zlotkin , Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Coalition, cryptography, and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation in task oriented domains, Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1), p.432-437, October 1994, Seattle, Washington, United States

CITED BY 3

	Tuomas Sandholm, Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negotiation and Coalition Formation, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, v.3 n.1, p.73-96, March 2000
	Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm, Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions, Artificial Intelligence, v.170 n.6, p.607-619, May 2006
	Vincent Conitzer , Thomas Sandholm, Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core, Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence, p.613-618, August 09-15, 2003, Acapulco, Mexico