The specification and implementation of “commercial” security requirements including dynamic segregation of duties

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The specification and implementation of “commercial” security requirements including dynamic segregation of duties

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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents

Zurich, Switzerland

Pages: 125 - 134

Year of Publication: 1997

ISBN:0-89791-912-2

Author

Simon N. Foley

Department of Computer Science, University College, Cork, Ireland

Sponsor

SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 9, Downloads (12 Months): 80, Citation Count: 7

Additional Information:

references cited by index terms collaborative colleagues

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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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	8	S. Foley. Building Chinese Walls in standard Unix, In Supplement to the Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Five-Minute Abstracts). Full length version submitted for publication.
	9	S. Foley. Aggregation and separation as noninterference properties. Journal of Computer Security, 1(2):159-188, 1992.
	10	S. Foley. Reasoning about confidentiality requirements. In Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Work. shop, pages 150-160, Franconia, NH, June 1994, IEEE Computer Society.
	11	Simon Foley , Li Gong , Xiaolei Qian, A Security Model of Dynamic Labeling Providing a Tiered Approach to Verification, Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, p.142, May 06-08, 1996
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CITED BY 7

	Simon N. Foley, Conduit cascades and secure synchronization, Proceedings of the 2000 workshop on New security paradigms, p.141-150, September 18-21, 2000, Ballycotton, County Cork, Ireland
	Simon N. Foley , John P. Morrison, Computational paradigms and protection, Proceedings of the 2001 workshop on New security paradigms, September 10-13, 2001, Cloudcroft, New Mexico
	Qihua Wang , Ninghui Li, Direct static enforcement of high-level security policies, Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security, March 20-22, 2007, Singapore
	Naftaly H. Minsky , Victoria Ungureanu, Unified support for heterogeneous security policies in distributed systems, Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, 1998, p.10-10, January 26-29, 1998, San Antonio, Texas
	Ninghui Li , Mahesh V. Tripunitara , Ziad Bizri, On mutually exclusive roles and separation-of-duty, ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), v.10 n.2, p.5-es, May 2007
	Constantin Serban , Naftaly Minsky, Generalized access control of synchronous communication, Proceedings of the ACM/IFIP/USENIX 2006 International Conference on Middleware, November 01-01, 2006, Melbourne, Australia
	Benjamin Aziz , Simon N. Foley , John Herbert , Garret Swart, Configuring storage-area networks using mandatory security, Journal of Computer Security, v.17 n.2, p.191-210, April 2009