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Strong password-only authenticated key exchange
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Volume 26 ,  Issue 5  (October 1996) table of contents
Pages: 5 - 26  
Year of Publication: 1996
ISSN:0146-4833
Author
David P. Jablon  Integrity Sciences, Inc., Westboro, MA
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 22,   Downloads (12 Months): 135,   Citation Count: 40
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ABSTRACT

A new simple password exponential key exchange method (SPEKE) is described. It belongs to an exclusive class of methods which provide authentication and key establishment over an insecure channel using only a small password, without risk of offline dictionary attack. SPEKE and the closely-related Diffie-Hellman Encrypted Key Exchange (DH-EKE) are examined in light of both known and new attacks, along with sufficient preventive constraints. Although SPEKE and DH-EKE are similar, the constraints are different. The class of strong password-only methods is compared to other authentication schemes. Benefits, limitations, and tradeoffs between efficiency and security are discussed. These methods are important for several uses, including replacement of obsolete systems, and building hybrid two-factor systems where independent password-only and key-based methods can survive a single event of either key theft or password compromise.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
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5
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6
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[GLNS93] L. Gong, M. Lomas, R. Needham, & J. Saltzer, "Protecting Poorly Chosen Secrets from Guessing Attacks", I.E.E.E. Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Vol. 11, No. 5, June 1993, pp. 648-656.
 
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15
[Sch96] B. Schneier, "Applied Cryptography Second Edition", John Wiley & Sons, 1996.
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[TA91] J. Tardo & K. Alagappan, "SPX: Global authentication using public key certificates", Proceedings of I.E.E.E. Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, pp. 232-244, May 1991.
 
18
[vOW96] P. C. van Oorschot, M. J. Wiener, "On Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement with Short Exponents", Proceedings of Eurocrypt '96, Springer-Verlag, May 1996.

CITED BY  40