Teleological reasoning in reason-based logic

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Teleological reasoning in reason-based logic

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International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law archive
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law table of contents

College Park, Maryland, United States

Pages: 11 - 20

Year of Publication: 1995

ISBN:0-89791-758-8

Author

Jaap Hage

University of Limburg, Department of Metajuridica, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht

Sponsors

IAAIL : Intl Asso for Artifical Intel & Law
UMIACS : U of MD Inst for Advanced Comp Studies
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 4, Downloads (12 Months): 33, Citation Count: 3

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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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CITED BY 3

	Tokuyasu Kakuta , Makoto Haraguchi, A demonstration of a legal reasoning system based on teleological analogies, Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law, p.196-205, June 14-17, 1999, Oslo, Norway
	James Palmer, Legal merit arguments, legal semiotics and the design of legal knowledge-based systems, Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law, p.198-206, June 30-July 03, 1997, Melbourne, Australia
	Carlos Iván Chesñevar , Ana Gabriela Maguitman , Ronald Prescott Loui, Logical models of argument, ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), v.32 n.4, p.337-383, Dec. 2000