ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Sharing the “cost” of multicast trees: an axiomatic analysis
Full text PdfPdf (1.46 MB)
Source Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication archive
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication table of contents
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States
Pages: 315 - 327  
Year of Publication: 1995
ISBN:0-89791-711-1
Also published in ...
Authors
Shai Herzog  Computer Science Department/ISI, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
Scott Shenker  Xerox PARC, 3333 Coyote Hill Road, Palo Alto, CA
Deborah Estrin  Computer Science Department/ISI, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
Sponsor
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 24,   Citation Count: 4
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/217382.217466
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

Given the need to provide users with reasonable feedback about the "costs" their network usage incurs, and the increasingly commercial nature of the Internet, we believe that the allocation of cost among users will play an important role in future networks. This paper discusses cost allocation in the context of multicast flows. The question we discuss is this: when a single data flow is shared among many receivers, how does one split the cost of that flow among the receivers? Multicast routing increases network efficiency by using a single shared delivery tree. We address the issue of how these savings are allocated among the various members of the multicast group. We first consider an axiomatic approach to the problem, analyzing the implications of different distributive notions on the resulting allocations. We then consider a one-pass mechanism to implement such allocation schemes and investigate the family of allocation schemes such mechanisms can support.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

1
 
2
H.W. Braun and K. Claffy. A Framework for Flow- Based Accounting on the Internet. Proceedings of SICON '93, fEEE Singapore, 1993.
3
 
4
5
6
 
7
D. Henriet and H. Moulin Traffic Based Cost Allocation in a Network. Rand Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
 
8
S.C. Littlechfld and G. Owen A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case. Management Sci. ence, ~0, 370-~, 1973.
 
9
 
10
J.K. MacKie-Mason and H.R. Varian. Pricing Congestable Network Resources. Preprint, October 1994.
 
11
N. Megiddo Computational Complexity of the Game Theory Approach to Cost Allocation for ,{ Tree. Mathematics of Operations Research, 3, 189-96, 1978.
 
12
H. Moulin Uniform Externalities: Two Axioms for Fair Allocation. Journal o} Public Economy ,i3 (1990) p305- 326.
 
13
H. Moulin Welfare Bound in the Cooperative Production Problem. Games and Economic Behavior Volume ~, (1992) p 37S-~01.
 
14
It. Moulin and S. Shenker Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison. Journal of Economic Theory 6Z(1), (199~) p. 178-201.
 
15
R.B. Myerson Game Theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991.
 
16
it. Peyton and I. Young (Eds.). Cost AUoc~tion: Methods, Principles, Applications. Elseviers Science Publishers, B. V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands and New York, N. v., V.S.A., ~985.
 
17
A.E. Roth (Ed.). The Shapley Value, an Essay in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988.
 
18
 
19
L.S. Shapley A Value for N-Person Games. In H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol Ii, Annals o} Mathematics Studies No. 28, Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 307- ~ 7, 195a.
 
20
W.W. Sharkey Network Models in Economics. Handbook ost Operations Research and Management Science: Networks, to appear.
 
21
 
22
L. Zhang, S. Deering, D. Estrin, S. Shenker, and D. Zappala RSVP: A New Resource Reservation Protocol. IEEE Networks Magazine, September 1993.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Shai Herzog: colleagues
Scott Shenker: colleagues
Deborah Estrin: colleagues