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Optimality and domination in repeated games with bounded players
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Source Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing archive
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing table of contents
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Pages: 741 - 749  
Year of Publication: 1994
ISBN:0-89791-663-8
Authors
Lance Fortnow  Department of Computer Science, The University of Chicago, 1100 East 58th Street, Chicago, Illinois
Duke Whang  Department of Computer Science, The University of Chicago, 1100 East 58th Street, Chicago, Illinois
Sponsor
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 17,   Citation Count: 7
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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
Ang87
 
GJ79
 
GS89
I. Gilboa and D. Samet. Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak. Games and Economic Behavior, 1(3):213-221, 1989.
 
HU79
 
Kal90
E. KaIai. Bounded rationality and strategic complexity in repeated games. In T. ichiishi, A. Neyman, and Y. Tauman, editors, Game Theory and Applications, pages 131- 157. Academic Press, San Diego, 1990.
 
Kno94
V. Knoblauch. Computable strategies for repeated prisoner's dilemma. Games and Economic Behavior, 1994. To appear.
 
RS93


Collaborative Colleagues:
Lance Fortnow: colleagues
Duke Whang: colleagues