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How to simultaneously exchange secrets by general assumptions
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Fairfax, Virginia, United States
Pages: 184 - 192  
Year of Publication: 1994
ISBN:0-89791-732-4
Authors
Tatsuaki Okamoto  NTT Laboratories, 1-2356, Take, Yokosuka-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 238-03 Japan
Kazuo Ohta  NTT Laboratories, 1-2356, Take, Yokosuka-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 238-03 Japan
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

The simultaneous secret exchange protocol is the key tool for contract signing protocols and certified mail protocols. This paper proposes efficient simultaneous secret exchange protocols (or gradual secret releasing protocols) that are based on general assumptions such as the existence of one-way permutations and one-way functions, while the existing efficient simultaneous secret exchange protocols are based on more constrained assumptions such as specific number theoretic problems and the existence of oblivious transfer primitives (or trap-door one-way permutations). Moreover, while the existing simultaneous secret exchange protocols have an additional requirement that the underlying commit (encryption) function is “ideal”, the above-mentioned “general assumptions” are provably sufficient for our schemes. Therefore, our protocols are provably secure under the general assumptions. In addition, our protocols are at least as efficient as the existing practical protocols, when efficient one-way permutations and one-way functions are used.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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BGMR
M. Ben-Or, O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and R. Rivcst, "A Fair Protocol for Signing Contracts," IEEE Tran. on IT, Vol. 36, Number 1, pp.40-46 (1990)
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I. Damg~rd, "Practical and Provably Secure Exchange of Digital Signatures (Extended Abstract)," to appear in Proc. of EURO- CRYPT'93
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O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson, "Proof that Yield Nothing but their Validity and a Methodilogy of Cryptographic Protocol Design," Proc. of FOCS'86 (1986)
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LMR
M. Luby, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff, "How to Simultaneously Exchange Secret Bit by Flipping a Symmetrically-Biased Coin," Proc. of FOCS'83, pp.23-30 (1983)
 
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M. Rabin, "How to Exchange Secrets by Oblivious Transfer," Tech. Menlo, TR-81, Aiken Comp. Lab., Harvard University (1981)
 
Yao
A. Yao, "How to Generate and Exchange Secrets," Proc. of FOCS'86, pp.162-167 (1986)

CITED BY  7

Collaborative Colleagues:
Tatsuaki Okamoto: colleagues
Kazuo Ohta: colleagues