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How to securely replicate services
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Source ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS) archive
Volume 16 ,  Issue 3  (May 1994) table of contents
Pages: 986 - 1009  
Year of Publication: 1994
ISSN:0164-0925
Authors
Michael K. Reiter  AT&T Bell Labs., Holmdel, NJ
Kenneth P. Birman  Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present a method for constructing replicated services that retain their availability and integrity despite several servers and clients being corrupted by an intruder, in addition to others failing benignly. We also address the issue of maintaining a causal order among client requests. We illustrate a security breach resulting from an intruder's ability to effect a violation of causality in the sequence of requests processed by the service and propose an approach to counter this attack. An important and novel feature of our techniques is that the client need not be able to identify or authenticate even a single server. Instead, the client is required to possess only a single public key for the service. We demonstrate the performance of our techniques with a service we have implemented using one of our protocols.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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CITED BY  13

Collaborative Colleagues:
Michael K. Reiter: colleagues
Kenneth P. Birman: colleagues