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Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Fairfax, Virginia, United States
Pages: 62 - 73  
Year of Publication: 1993
ISBN:0-89791-629-8
Authors
Mihir Bellare  High Performance Computing and Communications, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, P.O. Box 704, Yorktown Heights, NY
Phillip Rogaway  PS LAN System Design, IBM Personal Software Products, 11400 Burnet Road, Austin, TX
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 61,   Downloads (12 Months): 257,   Citation Count: 204
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ABSTRACT

We argue that the random oracle model—where all parties have access to a public random oracle—provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. In the paradigm we suggest, a practical protocol P is produced by first devising and proving correct a protocol PR for the random oracle model, and then replacing oracle accesses by the computation of an “appropriately chosen” function h. This paradigm yields protocols much more efficient than standard ones while retaining many of the advantages of provable security. We illustrate these gains for problems including encryption, signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  204

Collaborative Colleagues:
Mihir Bellare: colleagues
Phillip Rogaway: colleagues