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On the difficulty of software-based attestation of embedded devices
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Chicago, Illinois, USA
SESSION: Embedded and mobile devices table of contents
Pages: 400-409  
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-894-0
Authors
Claude Castelluccia  INRIA Rhone Alpes, Montbonnot, France
Aurélien Francillon  INRIA Rhone Alpes, montbonnot, France
Daniele Perito  INRIA Rhone Alpes, Montbonnot, France
Claudio Soriente  University of California, Irvine, Irvine, USA
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Device attestation is an essential feature in many security protocols and applications. The lack of dedicated hardware and the impossibility to physically access devices to be attested, makes attestation of embedded devices, in applications such as Wireless Sensor Networks, a prominent challenge. Several software-based attestation techniques have been proposed that either rely on tight time constraints or on the lack of free space to store malicious code. This paper investigates the shortcomings of existing software-based attestation techniques. We first present two generic attacks, one based on a return-oriented rootkit} and the other on code compression. We further describe specific attacks on two existing proposals, namely SWATT and ICE-based schemes, and argue about the difficulty of fixing them. All attacks presented in this paper were implemented and validated on commodity sensors.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Claude Castelluccia: colleagues
Aurélien Francillon: colleagues
Daniele Perito: colleagues
Claudio Soriente: colleagues