| A targeted web crawling for building malicious javascript collection |
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Conference on Information and Knowledge Management
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Proceeding of the ACM first international workshop on Data-intensive software management and mining
table of contents
Hong Kong, China
SESSION: Large-scale software corpus
table of contents
Pages: 23-26
Year of Publication: 2009
ISBN:978-1-60558-810-0
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 30, Downloads (12 Months): 39, Citation Count: 0
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ABSTRACT
Malicious javascript frequently serves as a starting point of web-based attacks, in particular cross-site scripting. Thus detecting malicious javascript before execution can protect users from attacks such as malware infection, drive-by downloads, and even from participating in denial-of-service attacks as part of botnet sometimes. A large collection of malicious javascript would help with detector development, but by the time crawler arrives at blacklisted domains attackers and malicious scripts are often long gone. We have used classifiers to direct a web crawler better towards more likely locations of malicious scripts, and show how this targeted web crawler performs compared to crawler seed with blacklisted-domains.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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