A market-based approach to software evolution

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A market-based approach to software evolution

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Conference on Object Oriented Programming Systems Languages and Applications archive
Proceeding of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN conference companion on Object oriented programming systems languages and applications table of contents

Orlando, Florida, USA

SESSION: Onward! short papers session 3: big thunder mountain table of contents

Pages 973-980

Year of Publication: 2009

ISBN:978-1-60558-768-4

Authors

David F. Bacon	IBM Research and Harvard University, Hawthorne, MA, USA
Yiling Chen	Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
David Parkes	Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
Malvika Rao	Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Sponsor

SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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ABSTRACT

Software correctness has bedeviled the field of computer science since its inception. Software complexity has increased far more quickly than our ability to control it, reaching sizes that are many orders of magnitude beyond the reach of formal or automated verification techniques.

We propose a new paradigm for evaluating "correctness" based on a rich market ecosystem in which coalitions of users bid for features and fixes. Developers, testers, bug reporters, and analysts share in the rewards for responding to those bids. In fact, we suggest that the entire software development process can be driven by a disintermediated market-based mechanism driven by the desires of users and the capabilities of developers.

The abstract, unspecifiable, and unknowable notion of absolute correctness is then replaced by quantifiable notions of correctness demand (the sum of bids for bugs) and correctness potential (the sum of the available profit for fixing those bugs). We then sketch the components of a market design intended to identify bugs, elicit demand for fixing bugs, and source workers for fixing bugs. The ultimate goal is to achieve a more appropriate notion of correctness, in which market forces drive software towards a correctness equilibrium in which all bugs for which there is enough value, and with low enough cost to fix, are fixed.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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