An economic framework for dynamic spectrum access and service pricing

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An economic framework for dynamic spectrum access and service pricing

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IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) archive
Volume 17 , Issue 4 (August 2009) table of contents

Pages 1200-1213

Year of Publication: 2009

ISSN:1063-6692

Authors

Shamik Sengupta	Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ
Mainak Chatterjee	School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL

Publisher

IEEE Press Piscataway, NJ, USA

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 47, Downloads (12 Months): 47, Citation Count: 0

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DOI Bookmark:	10.1109/TNET.2008.2007758

ABSTRACT

The concept of dynamic spectrum access will allow the radio spectrum to be traded in a market like scenario allowing wireless service providers (WSPs) to lease chunks of spectrum on a short-term basis. Such market mechanisms will lead to competition among WSPs where they not only compete to acquire spectrum but also attract and retain users. Currently, there is little understanding on how such a dynamic trading system will operate so as to make the system feasible under economic terms.

In this paper, we propose an economic framework that can be used to guide i) the dynamic spectrum allocation process and ii) the service pricing mechanisms that the providers can use. We propose a knapsack based auction model that dynamically allocates spectrum to the WSPs such that revenue and spectrum usage are maximized. We borrow techniques from game theory to capture the conflict of interest between WSPs and end users. A dynamic pricing strategy for the providers is also proposed. We show that even in a greedy and non-cooperative behavioral game model, it is in the best interest of the WSPs to adhere to a price and channel threshold which is a direct consequence of price equilibrium. Through simulation results, we show that the proposed auction model entices WSPs to participate in the auction, makes optimal use of the spectrum, and avoids collusion among WSPs. We demonstrate how pricing can be used as an effective tool for providing incentives to the WSPs to upgrade their network resources and offer better services.

REFERENCES

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