A reputation system for selling human computation

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A reputation system for selling human computation

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International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining archive
Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Human Computation table of contents

Paris, France

SESSION: Human computation in practice table of contents

Pages 54-57

Year of Publication: 2009

ISBN:978-1-60558-672-4

Authors

Trevor Burnham	University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Rahul Sami	University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI

Sponsors

Microsoft Research : Microsoft Research
: Carnegie Mellon

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 12, Downloads (12 Months): 12, Citation Count: 0

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ABSTRACT

We describe a reputation-driven market that motivates human computation sellers (workers) to produce optimal levels of quality when quality is not immediately measurable and contracts specifying the level of quality cannot be enforced. We consider the implications of making quality instantaneously verifiable up to a known threshold ("partial verification"), as might be the case when the market maker possesses a sufficiently advanced artificial intelligence apparatus. We find that such a verification system allows the market to attain a Pareto optimal equilibrium with less patient workers, and, in addition, makes the market more resistant to pseudonym attacks.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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