Why lawyers are nice (or nasty): a game-theoretical argumentation exercise

ABSTRACT

This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.

REFERENCES

• 1: Phan Minh Dung, On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games, Artificial Intelligence, v.77 n.2, p.321-357, Sept. 1995 [doi>10.1016/0004-3702(94)00041-X]
• 2: Régis Riveret , Henry Prakken , Antonino Rotolo , Giovanni Sartor, Heuristics in Argumentation: A Game-Theoretical Investigation, Proceeding of the 2008 conference on Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2008, p.324-335, June 21, 2008
• 3: Régis Riveret , Antonino Rotolo , Giovanni Sartor , Henry Prakken , Bram Roth, Success chances in argument games: a probabilistic approach to legal disputes, Proceeding of the 2007 conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems: JURIX 2007: The Twentieth Annual Conference, p.99-108, June 15, 2007
• 4: Michel Rudnianski. Deterrence typology and nuclear stability: A game theoretic approach. In Defence Decision Making, pages 137--68. Springer, Heidelberg, 1991.
• 5: Jörgen Weibull. Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT, 1995.

INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  K. Computing Milieux
  K.5 LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTING
      K.5.0 General

Additional Classification:
  A. General Literature
  A.m MISCELLANEOUS

  I. Computing Methodologies
  I.2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
      I.2.0 General

General Terms:
Legal Aspects, Theory

Keywords:
argumentation, evolution, game theory