Network bargaining

Subscribe (Full Service)


	Search: The ACM Digital Library The Guide

	Feedback

Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results

Full text

Pdf (696 KB)

Source

Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents

Stanford, California, USA

SESSION: Session 5 table of contents

Pages 159-168

Year of Publication: 2009

ISBN:978-1-60558-458-4

Authors

Tanmoy Chakraborty	University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Michael Kearns	University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Sanjeev Khanna	University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

Sponsors

ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

Bibliometrics

Downloads (6 Weeks): 12, Downloads (12 Months): 29, Citation Count: 0

Additional Information:

abstract references index terms collaborative colleagues

Tools and Actions:	Request Permissions Review this Article Save this Article to a Binder Display Formats: BibTeX EndNote ACM Ref

DOI Bookmark:	Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1566374.1566398 What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

We consider models for bargaining in social networks, in which players are represented by vertices and edges represent bilateral opportunities for deals between pairs of players. Each deal yields some fixed wealth if its two players can agree on how to divide it; otherwise it yields no wealth. In such a setting, Chakraborty and Kearns (WINE 2008) introduced a simple axiomatic model that stipulates an equilibrium concept in which all players are rationally satisfied with their shares. We further explore that equilibrium concept here. In particular, we give an FPTAS to compute approximate equilibrium in bipartite graphs. We also show that equilibrium is not unique, and give conditions that ensure uniqueness on regular graphs. Finally, we explore the effect of network structure on solutions given by our model, using simulation methods and statistical analysis.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

	1	A.L. Barabasi and R. Albert. Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science, 286:509--512, 1999.
	2	E.J. Bienenstock and P. Bonacich. The core as a solution to exclusionary networks. Social Networks, 14:231--44, 1992.
	3	K. Binmore. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 2: Just Playing. The MIT Press, 1998.
	4	N. Braun and T. Gautschi. A nash bargaining model for simple exchange networks. Social Networks, 28(1):1--23, 2006.
	5	Tanmoy Chakraborty , Michael Kearns, Bargaining Solutions in a Social Network, Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, December 17-20, 2008, Shanghai, China [doi>10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_61]
	6	K.S. Cook and T. Yamagishi. Power in exchange networks: A power-dependence formulation. Social Networks, 14:245--265, 1992.
	7	S. Currarini, M.O. Jackson, and P. Pin. An economic model of friendship: Homophily, minorities and segregation. Econometrica (forthcoming), 2009.
	8	Xiaotie Deng , Christos H. Papadimitriou, On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts, Mathematics of Operations Research, v.19 n.2, p.257-266, May 1994 [doi>10.1287/moor.19.2.257]
	9	P. Erdos and A. Renyi. On random graphs. Publicationes Mathematicae, 6:290--297, 1959.
	10	N. Friedkin. An expected value model of social power: Predictions for selected exchange networks. Social Networks, 14:213--230, 1992.
	11	Matthew O. Jackson, Average Distance, Diameter, and Clustering in Social Networks with Homophily, Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, December 17-20, 2008, Shanghai, China [doi>10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_3]
	12	J. Stephen Judd , Michael Kearns, Behavioral experiments in networked trade, Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, July 08-12, 2008, Chicago, Il, USA [doi>10.1145/1386790.1386817]
	13	S.M. Kakade, M.J. Kearns, L.E. Ortiz, R. Pemantle, and S. Suri. Economic properties of social networks. In Neural Information Processing Systems Conference (NIPS), 2004.
	14	M. Kearns, S. Judd, J. Tan, and J. Wortman. Behavioral experiments on biased voting in networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(5):1347--1352, 2009.
	15	Jon Kleinberg , Éva Tardos, Balanced outcomes in social exchange networks, Proceedings of the 40th annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, May 17-20, 2008, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada [doi>10.1145/1374376.1376994]
	16	B. Markovsky, J. Skvoretz, D. Willer, M. Lovaglia, and J. Erger. The seeds of weak power: An extension of network exchange theory. American Sociological Review, 58:197--209, 1993.
	17	J. Skvoretz and D. Willer. Exclusion and power: a test of four theories of power in exchange networks. American Sociological Review, 58(6):801--818, 1993.